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ABSTRACT
The policy centerpiece of President Xi Jinping's foreign
strategy, China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), ambitiously
aspires towards expanding regional markets and facilitating
regional cooperation. In context of a rising volume of cross-border
transactions generated by the BRI, a robust legal framework on
dispute resolution is required to forge investor confidence and
enable BRI's integral goal of economic integration. In light of the
substantial evels of harmonization among arbitration laws,
arbitration is argued to constitute a primary vehicle of
international commercial dispute resolution in an economically
integrated Asia under the BRI. It is against this backdrop that
the Article argues that the BRI provides a unique opportunity to
contemplate the possibility of regional harmonization, as within
the Asian economies along the BRI, of the public policy exception
to arbitral enforcement. Such an arbitration initiative in Asia, in
which China is anticipated to take a proactive role, holds a
wealth of potential to project renewed momentum on China as an
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engine of not only economic power, but also soft power
transformation in pioneering international legal norms.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The policy centerpiece of President Xi Jinping's foreign strategy,
China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) (officially referred to by the
Chinese government as -9-V#, yidai yilu), ambitiously aspires
towards expanding regional markets, facilitating regional cooperation
and economic integration amongst the nations of the anecdotal Belt
and Road map.' The BRI presently spans and traverses sixty-five
countries in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.2
1. Visions and Actions on Jointly Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-
Century Maritime Silk Road, NAT'L DEV. & REFORM COMM'N-PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF
CHINA (Mar. 28, 2015), http://en.ndrc.gov.cn/newsrelease/201503/t2O15O330
669367.html [https://perma.cc/N2RT-U66E] (archived Aug. 23, 2018) [hereinafter
Visions and Actions]. As announced by China's National Development and Reform
Commission (NDRC), the mechanisms and initiatives for regional cooperation under the
BRI include the establishment of unified mechanisms for infrastructure building;
standardizing and ensuring compatibility of transport rules; establishment of free trade
areas; multilateral information exchange and inspection in trade cooperation; bolstering
financial regulation cooperation; and promoting cultural exchange and friendship
between the Belt and Road nations and their peoples. Id.
2. Country Profiles, BELT AND ROAD, http:/Ibeltandroad.hktdc.com/en/country-
profiles/country-profiles.aspx (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.ccN8G2-LFZR]
(archived Aug. 23, 2018).
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The formation of this economic bloc exhibits among its features
the establishment and operation of cooperation zones, designated
funds for infrastructural project financing and investment, as well as
a gradual dismantling of trade barriers among the Belt and Road
nations. Such an economic bloc has already yielded substantial
increases in regional trade volume.3 In 2015, China's trade within the
Belt and Road region reportedly surpassed $1 trillion USD, accounting
for approximately a quarter of China's trade value that year.4 The
resulting potential for expanding cross-border commercial
collaboration, trade, and investment yields among all the Belt and
Road nations a common economic interest-an interest to capitalize on
Lte manifold and multitudinous opportunities produced and
stimulated by China's BRI. The strengthening of systems for regional
economic cooperation among Belt and Road states and their investors
thus promises collateral benefits for people and markets across all of
the Belt and Road economies.
It is within this context of a steadily increasing volume of cross-
border transactions and joint commercial enterprises that a robust
legal framework is required to support and facilitate regional economic
integration. The reasons are twofold. First, given a projected increase
in numbers of multinational civil and contractual disputes arising out
of the Belt and Road transactions, mechanisms and institutions for the
fair and efficient resolution of cross-border disputes must be in place
to resolve inter-party conflicts. In this context, three forms of
contractual disputes may arise. These are, respectively, "state-state"
disputes, "investor-state" disputes, and "investor-investor" disputes. In
addition to facilitating the speedy resolution of disputes, such well-
functioning mechanisms and institutions further serve to ensure
foreign investor confidence in the BRI, whether such investments are
made by state entities or private investors.5 Second, a well-functioning
dispute resolution system yields a secondary benefit of increasing
transactional efficiency and reducing transactional costs for private
investors and state parties to Belt and Road infrastructural projects.
In particular, the minimization of transaction costs among Belt and
Road nations operates to create a fertile environment for commerce
and business, encouraging the same, and by extension, furthers the
goal of economic integration within the Asian region.6
3. China's trade with Belt and Road countries surpasses 1 trillion USD in 2015,
XINHUA NET (June 22, 2016), http://news.xinhuanet.com/englishl2016-06/22/c_13545
8107.htm [https://perma.cc/YY3Z-W5HR] (archived Aug. 23, 2018).
4. Id.
5. See, e.g., Chen YongMei, The Legal Climate for Foreign Investment in China
after its WTO Accession, 20 BOND L. REV. 30, 31 (2008) (discussing the fundamental
importance to investors of an established legal system).
6. See Liu Xin, One Belt One Road: The Transaction Cost Approach, CHINESE
UNIV. OF HONG KONG Bus. SCH. (Sept. 15, 2016), https://cbk.bschool.cuhk.edu.hkone-
belt-one-road-the-transaction-cost-approach/ [https://perma.cc/ADP5-HKWP] (archived
Aug. 23, 2018) (discussing the transaction cost theory and the benefits of the One Belt
One Road Initiative).
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It is expected that international commercial arbitration will,
under market forces, form a preferred, indeed optimal, primary vehicle
for commercial dispute resolution under the BRI. 7 This is in
consideration of the traditional distrust and reluctance of investors to
utilize foreign courts-with which they may not be familiar-to resolve
commercial disputes. Indeed, a further consideration lies due to
international commercial arbitration's potential for offering
commercially flexible solutions and particular suitability for
mitigating conflicts between different legal systems. In addition,
taking into consideration the frequently transnational nature of
commerce and infrastructural investment under the BRI, the existing
system of highly harmonized arbitration laws among countries across
the world provides a sturdy basis for utilizing a dispute resolution
process untethered to the laws of a particular jurisdiction, and thus
more likely to be amenable to all parties involved. In light of the wide
reach of the BRI inclusive of the Asian, African, and European
continents, investors may have regard to a plethora of indicators of
development level, ranging from capacity-building to political and
economic indicators, in determining the most appropriate neutral fora
to resolve commercial disputes via arbitration, if and when they arise.
This Article therefore provides a comprehensive comparative analysis
of the Asia-Pacific nations along the Belt and Road for international
comnmercial arbitration.
The prominent level of harmonization already existing among the
international arbitration laws of many Belt and Road countries
renders arbitration the ideal mechanism of dispute resolution.
Moreover, arbitration as part of a harmonized legal framework is
necessary to fulfill the collateral dispute- resolution needs of increased
commercial trade and investment collaboration, and to further the goal
of economic integration. It is against this backdrop that the author
contends that the BRI provides a unique opportunity to contemplate
the real possibility of a "geo-legal" harmonization of the public policy
exception to arbitral enforcement within Belt and Road nations.
The public policy exception, which expresses fundamental policy
considerations for non-enforcement of awards within and by national
courts, is an exception to the generally harmonized system of
arbitration laws.8 Frequently characterized as an "unruly horse" due
7. Indeed, Hong Kong's Secretary for Justice Rimsky Yuen envisioned that
opportunities for outward expansion of the local legal and arbitration sectors lay in
providing services to alleviating the "legal uncertainties" along "One Belt, One Road"
countries. See Secretary for Justice promotes Hong Kong's legal and dispute resolution
service in Beijing, HONG KONG DEP'T OF JUSTICE (Aug. 18, 2015),
http://www.doj.gov.hk/mobile/eng/public/pr/20150818_pr.html [https://perma.cclK9AT-
RNNK] (archived Aug. 23, 2018) [hereinafter DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE].
8. See Troy L. Harris, The 'Public Policy' Exception to Enforcement of
International Arbitration Awards under the New York Convention, with Particular
Reference to Construction Disputes, 24 J. INT'L ARB. 9, 10 (2007) (discussing the public
policy exception).
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to the indeterminacy of its ambit, it yields corresponding negative
implications for commercial certainty, business efficacy, and investor
confidence in light of the BRI.9 This shortcoming may be regarded as
de facto addressed by jurisdictions' pro-enforcement judicial
approaches encompassing narrow interpretation and application of the
public policy. Regardless, the high-stake commercial and investment
concerns of the BRI, particularly within China herself, are expected to
demand greater delineation and definition of concerns prescribed by
the exception to enforcement.
In addition, while this Article focuses on harmonization of the
public policy concept in the context of international commercial
arbitration, its conceptual homogenization is also envisioned to retain
relevance in the wider contexts of investment arbitration generally.
One notes that from a practical perspective, the feasibility of such
harmonization of the public policy exception will depend on
receptiveness to embracing the new concept of a "regional" public policy
of the Chinese government and judicial system. This may be answered
with the submission that such developments, in relation to which
China is anticipated to take a proactive role, hold great potential to
serve as a positive regional example demonstrating both the feasibility
of, and common economic benefits in the regional harmonization of
legal norms. Additionally, the implications of the arbitration initiative
proposed are themselves far-reaching. While conceived specifically in
the context of the BRI, the conceptual harmonization of international
commercial arbitration holds exciting potential significance for China's
soft power rise from a passive norm adherent to an active norm
formulator.
This Article is structured as follows. Part II sets out the salient
features and significant institutions constituting China's BRI. Part III
proceeds to consider the necessity and attractiveness of harmonization
of legal norms from the dual standpoints of a normative jurisprudential
perspective, and the practical benefits of enhancing commercial
efficiency under the BRI. International commercial arbitration and, in
particular, the public policy exception, are identified as prime initial
targets for harmonization efforts. Part IV then considers the practical
mechanics of harmonizing the public policy exception. The possible
substantive contents of a public policy exception, utilizing a "negative
list" approach, are then considered, with reference to similar
harmonization efforts of the European Union (EU) and the
Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa
(OHADA). In Part V, the far-reaching implications of China's BRI upon
an evolving global landscape are considered. In particular, the
changing power dynamics of the Asian region developing under the
BRI will be analyzed as forming the catalyst for China's increased role
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II. CHINA'S BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE AND AN ECONOMICALLY
INTEGRATED ASIA
The following Part seeks to provide a brief overview of the BRI
first in terms of its vision of strengthening the regional economic
cooperation and integration. The key financial institutions belying the
BRI and their recent contributions are then examined. Finally, this
Part discusses the increasing economic integration (and the
corresponding need for a legal regulatory structure capable of
encompassing such integration) and the benefits thereof, anticipated
to be effected under the BRI.
A. The Vision of the Belt and Road Initiative
The BRI endeavors to stimulate development, promote
infrastructural growth, open up markets, and expand trade volume
within Asia by connecting the resource-rich regions of west and central
Asia to the emerging economies of south and southeast Asia.10 The
geographic spread of the Belt and Road connects Asia, eastern Europe,
and northern Africa along five routes. Consisting of the "Silk Road
Economic Belt" and the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road," the land-
based Silk Road Economic Belt (i) connects China with Europe, via
central Asia and Russia; (ii) connects China with the Middle East, via
central Asia; and (iii) bolsters greater unification between China and
southeast Asia by the Indian Ocean." In a similar vein, the ocean-
based Maritime Silk Road seeks to improve connectivity over the South
China Sea.12 This is envisioned to be achieved via the linkage of China
with (i) Europe via the Indian Ocean and South China Sea; and (ii) the
South Pacific Ocean via the South China Sea.'3 Notably, the China-
Pakistan Economic Corridor and the Bangladesh-China-India-
Myanmar Economic Corridor are existing proposed initiatives
encompassing target areas for the Belt and Road projects and
transactions.14
In recognizing that countries along the Belt and Road have their
own distinctive economic and resource advantages, the Belt and Road
leadership emphasizes five different aspects of practical
collaboration.'5
10. Geethanjali Nataraj & Richa Sekhani, China's One Belt One Road-An
Indian Perspective, 50 ECON. & POL. WKLY. 67, 67 (2015).
11. The Belt and Road Initiative, TRADE DEV. COUNCIL RES. (May 3, 2018),
http://china-trade-research.hktdc.com/business-news/article/One-Belt-One-Road/The-
Belt-and-Road-Initiativeobor/en/I/1X000000/1XOA36B7.htm [https://perma.cc/HR98-
DHM8] (archived Aug. 23, 2018).
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. See Mohd Aminul Karim & Faria Islam, Bangladesh-China-India-Myanmar
(BCIM) Economic Corridor: Challenges and Prospects, 30 KOREAN J. DEF. ANALYSIS 283,
285 (2018).
15. Visions and Actions, supra note 1.
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First, the strengthening of policy communication, through the
creation and enhancement of multi-level intergovernmental macro
policy exchange and communication systems aimed at cross-border
cooperation of economic development policies. 16 Second, the
facilitation of connectivity toward the end of a connected network of
passages spanning across Asia, Europe, and Africa. 17 Third,
facilitation of trade, through the removal of investment and trade
barriers and establishment of free trade areas to create a fertile
regional commercial environment.1 8 Fourth, financial integration, by
encouraging multilateral financial cooperation through the
establishment and operation of financing institutions.19 Finally, the
promotion of mutual understanding amongst peoples, through the
promotion of cultural exchange, expansion of tourism industries, and
increase of knowledge sharing.20
B. Key Institutions of the Belt and Road Initiative
The wide-ranging visions of the BRI, gearing towards increased
economic cooperation and common integration, have been realized
through the Chinese government's creation of and leadership under a
number of key institutions. The most significant institutions are the
Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the Silk Road Fund.
1. Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank
Infrastructural development projects under the Belt and Road
have thus far been augmented by the establishment of the AIIB in
October 2014, with the institution's Articles of Agreement entering into
force in December 2015.21 The AIIB cooperates with existing regional
multilateral development banks to address infrastructural
development needs in Asia, with a particular view to the development
of productive sectors.22
In terms of corporate structure, the highest decision-making body
in the AIIB is the board of governors, to which each member country is
entitled to elect one governor and one alternative governor, and in
which all authority and powers of the AIIB are vested.23 A nonresident






21. About AIIB-Introduction, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INv. BANK,
https://www.aiib.org/enlabout-aiib/index.html (last visited June 6, 2018)
[https://perma.cclGSP4-7Z94] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
22. Id.
23. Governance Overview-AIlB, ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INV. BANK,
https://www.aiib.org/enlabout-aiib/governance/index.html ( ast visited June 6, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/3E2M-WPJ4] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
[VOL. 51:13051312
BELTAND ROAD ARBITRATION IN ASIA
management operations of the bank, spearheading policy formation
and approving the AIIB's annual strategy and budget.24 The AIIB is
managed by a senior management eam comprised of one president
(Mr. Jin Liqun), five vice-presidents, and a general counsel for Policy
and Strategy, Investments, Finance, Administration, and the
Corporate Secretariat.25 An international advisory panel provides
strategy and policy guidance, as well as advice as to matters relating
to general operations.26 While the AIIB is a distinctly China-led
initiative, professionals and representatives from a diverse range of
AIIB member states participate in and wield influence at all levels of
corporate governance.
In its first year of operations commencing on January 16, 2016,
the AIIB undertook to finance a series of major infrastructural
development projects and initiatives. Among its first operations in
June 2016 were the approval of a $165 million USD loan to enhance
power distribution capacities and electricity consumption in
Bangladesh's Distribution System Upgrade and Expansion Project; a
$216.5 million USD loan for the National Slum Upgrading Project in
Indonesia; a $100 million USD loan sponsoring the Shorkot-Khanewal
Section of Pakistan's National Motorway M4; and a $27.5 million USD
loan for Tajikistan's Dushanbe-Uzbekistan Border Road Improvement
Project.27 In all except the Bangladesh Distribution System Upgrade
and Expansion Project, the loans are being co-financed by multilateral
institutions ranging from the World Bank and Asian Development
Bank to the United Kingdom-based Department for International
Development and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. More recently in December 2016, the AIIB approved a
$600 million USD loan, to be co-financed with a further $800 million
USD loan, by World Bank for the Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas
Pipeline Project connecting Azerbaijan to Europe.28
2. Silk Road Fund
In a similar vein, a $40 billion USD Silk Road Fund was




27. AIIB's Board of Directors Approves $509 M Financing for its First 4 Projects:
Power, Transport and Urban: Investments span South, Southeast and Central Asia,
AsIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INV. BANK (June 24, 2016), https://www.aiib.org/en/news-
events/news/2016/20160624_001.html [https://perma.cc/SA5H-HXQR] (archived Aug.
24, 2018).
28. Trans-Anatolian Natural Gas Pipelines Project (TANAP), THE WORLD BANK
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29, 2014.29 Established as a limited liability company, the Chinese
fund sponsors infrastructural, resource, and energy development and
cooperation between Belt and Road nations under the BRI, through the
provision of investment and financing services.30 In terms of corporate
governance, the Silk Road Fund is headed by an eleven-strong board
of directors, to which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Ministry of
Commerce, the Ministry of Finance, the National Development and
Reform Commission, the State Administration of Foreign Exchange,
the China Investment Corporation, the China Development Bank, and
the Export-Import Bank of China are entitled to nominate one
member, in addition to two directors representing a senior executive
and an employee representative of the Silk Road Fund, respectively.3 '
The corporate structure reflects the Silk Road Fund being the
prerogative of, and remaining accountable to, the Chinese government
in all matters relating to the BRI.
Since its inception, the Silk Road Fund has financed and invested
in a plethora of both new and existing infrastructural projects relating
to the BRI. The Silk Road Fund's first investment in April 2015 was in
relation to a $1.65 billion USD Karot hydropower project in Pakistan,
forming part of the broader $46 billion USD China-Pakistan Economic
Corridor initiative, a central arrangement of the BRI aiming at
bolstering connectivity and trade links between China's Xinjiang
Uyghur autonomous region and Pakistan's southwestern Gwadar
Port. 32 Another significant Silk Road Fund investment was its
acquisition of a 9.9 percent equity stake in the $27 billion USD Yamal
LNG natural gas plant project situated in Sabetta, Russia, from
Russian natural gas producing powerhouse, Novatek.3 3 Most recently,
the Silk Road Fund completed an acquisition of a 10 percent minority
stake in Russian gas processing and petrochemicals company Public
Joint-Stock Company SIBUR Holding.
34
29. Silk Road Fund Co. Ltd. was established as a limited liability company and
is initially financed by substantial investments from the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange, the China Development Bank, the China Investment Corporation and Export-
Import Bank. See Overview, SILK ROAD FUND, http://www.silkroadfund.com.cnlenweb/
23775/23767/index.html (last visited Sept. 1, 2016) [https://perma.cc/65VR-8KW4]
(archived Aug. 24, 2018).
30. Id.
31. Articles of Association, SILK ROAD FUND,
http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23786/23796/index.html (last visited Sept. 1,
2016) [https://perma.cc/37YX-C8EA] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
32. Silk Road Fund's 1st investment makes China's words into practice, THE
STATE COUNCIL OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Apr. 21, 2015),
http://english.gov.cn/news/topnews/2015/04/21/content_281475093213830.htm
[https://perma.cc/7E2E-RPRH] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
33. Russia's Novatek completes deal to sell Yamal LNG stake to China's Silk
Road, REUTERS (Mar. 15, 2016), http://af.reuters.com/article/commoditiesNews/
idAFR4N0ZC01H [https://perma.cc/LJ8Z-C3Y2] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
34. Silk Road Fund Concludes the Transaction of Acquiring 10% Stake in PJSC
SIBUR HOLDING, SILK ROAD FUND (Jan. 25, 2017),
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C. An Economically Integrated Asia under the Belt and Road
Initiative
The BRI as aided by the AIIB and the Silk Road Fund is envisaged
to play an indispensable role in connecting markets and addressing
infrastructural needs across central Asia and southeast Asia, in light
of existing infrastructural deficits and untapped development potential
across the region.5 Infrastructural development has been confirmed
by the literature to hold positive causal relationships with economic
growth and poverty reduction.3 6 The Asian Development Bank has
recently estimated that developing Asia will require investments of
$26 trillion USD from 2016 to 2030, or $1.7 trillion USD per annum, in
order to eradicate poverty, to continue growth momentum, and to
counter the effects of climate change.3 7 In this regard, infrastructural
investment holds the potential to bolster sustainable, long-term
regional economic growth and productivity and to increase regional
competitiveness by generating commercial activity and creating
employment opportunities, which themselves lift communities out of
poverty.3 8
The infrastructural projects generated by virtue of the BRI
development are expected to widely increase commercial collaboration
among states and their investors. By way of facilitation, market
liberalization and reduction of trade barriers under the BRI are further
expected to stimulate an abundance of commercial and trade
opportunities within a region of increasing economic integration.3 9
Economic integration itself yields, broadly, a multitude of benefits,
including boosts of cross-border trade, movement of goods and services
at lower costs, homogenization of national trade and fiscal policies, and
creation of employment opportunities. 40 In economic literature,
differing forms and degrees of economic integration are frequently
categorized by reference to a spectrum characterized by increasing
integration.41 Such forms edging towards integration occurring over
http://www.silkroadfund.com.cn/enweb/23809/23812/33134/index.html
[https://perma.cc/S2NV-GM2P] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
35. See Gilberto M. Llanto et al., Infrastructure Financing, Public-Private
Partnerships and Development in the Asia-Pacific Region, 22 ASIA-PACIFIC DEV. J. 27,
61-62 (2015).
36. Id. at 27. For an in-depth discussion of the causal link between infrastructure
development and economic output growth in the context of China, see Pravakar Sahoo
et al., Infrastructure Development and Economic Growth in China (Inst. of Developing
Economies, Discussion Paper No. 261, 2010).
37. ASIAN DEV. BANK, MEETING ASIA's INFRASTRUCTURE NEEDS vii (2017),
https://www.adb.org/publications/asia-infrastructure-needs [https://perma.cc/6UJ2-
ZG26] (archived Aug. 24, 2018).
38. Sahoo et al., supra note 36.
39. See Xin, supra note 6.
40. See Bela Balassa, The Theory of Economic Integration: An Introduction, in
THE EUROPEAN UNION 173, 174 (Brent F. Nelson & Alexander C-G. Stubb eds., 1998)
(discussing the concept of integration and its results).
41. Id.
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the spectrum range from free trade areas, customs unions, common
markets, and economic unions, to complete economic integration.
42
The degree of economic integration to be facilitated by China's BRI
development will naturally hinge upon the economic cooperation and
national policies of governments in the Asia region. In any event, such
integration is anticipated to mature and develop over time as the BRI
becomes a cornerstone of regional economic relations and cross-border
commercial transactions.43 The potential development of a de facto
zone of economic integration under the BRI, similar to the common
market created by the European Economic Community (EEC), will
further allow participant countries access to substantial markets to
build export capacities and to strengthen national economic
institutions, by creating much-needed trade opportunities within Belt
and Road nations in Asia and beyond.44 In addition, regional economic
harmonization reduces transaction and commercial costs, yielding
benefits for all parties involved.4 5
The proper and efficient functioning of such a system, regardless
of the level of economic integration envisaged, requires an analogous
level of legal harmonization. By way of analogy, one may consider the
Uniform Commercial Code, which was published in the United States
in the 1950s and aimed at harmonizing the law governing commercial
transactions and sales among all American states and territories.
46
The Uniform Commercial Code was, like the present case with the BRI,
conceived in the light of increasingly large volumes of interstate
commercial transactions and need to harmonize and modernize
contract laws.47 The end of forging consistency between legal and
regulatory norms among China and the Belt and Road nations is aimed
at harmonization rather than creating uniformity. From a general
perspective, such practices bolster the efficiency of trade and
commercial transactions. This is in addition to providing a region-
compatible framework for effective dispute resolution. Such an
analysis may be summarized as targeting a "cost-savings" motivation
of the harmonization of standards.48
42. Id.
43. Xin, supra note 6.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. See Robert Braucher, The Legislative History of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 798, 798-99 (1958).
47. Id.
48. Jonathan M. Miller identified four "types" of international legal norm
transplants, based upon the motivation for their adoption. These are summarized as
being (a) externally dictated, i.e., those brought about by external forces; (b) cost-savings,
i.e., those geared at promoting economic efficiency; (c) entrepreneurial, i.e., those
transplants motivated by expectation of advantage, whether material or political, to
those who propose them; and (d) legitimacy-generating, i.e., those geared at reaping the
perceived prestige of adopting foreign norms. While Miller discusses transplantation of
norms rather than harmonization, it is contended that the same motivations apply here.
Souichirou Kozuka & Luke Nottage, Independent Directors in Asia: Theoretical Lessons
and Practical Implications, in INDEPENDENT DIRECTORS IN ASIA: A HISTORICAL,
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Two other reasons for an effective dispute resolution framework,
arising out of the specific context of the BRI development, may be
offered. First, considering an expected rise in multinational civil and
contractual disputes arising out of the BRI transactions, mechanisms
for the fair and efficient resolution of disputes must exist and be
equipped to resolve inter-party conflicts fairly and efficiently. That
such dispute resolution systems always be regarded as impartial and
effective is imperative in securing confidence in the commercial
opportunities brought by the BRI by all parties involved, and thus the
continued success of a cross-border initiative. Second, the existence of
a well-regarded and well-functioning dispute resolution system
promises the additional benefits of transactional efficiency, which
reduces costs for investors of and parties to infrastructural projects
under the BRI. Efforts to minimize, as far as possible, transaction costs
among parties across the Belt and Road economies creates an
appealing, fertile environment for cross-border commerce and
business, which furthers the aim of economic integration within the
Asian region under the BRI development.
III. ARBITRATION AS A PRIMARY VEHICLE OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE
RESOLUTION
Within the context of increased commercial collaboration among
Belt and Road nations and their investors in respect of Belt and Road
projects, it is expected that three forms of contractual disputes may
arise. They are, respectively, (i) state-state disputes; (ii) investor-state
disputes; and (iii) investor-investor disputes. Such categorization,
while more applicable as a distinction in theory, is chosen to illustrate
the significant combination of public and private investment forces
driving and funding the BRI development, and its common goals.
Regardless of the private/public nature of the Belt and Road
investment, however, it is contended that the determinative
considerations underlying the selection of dispute resolution
mechanisms, when such disputes arise, are applicable to each class of
dispute. Investors, whether in the capacity of private corporations or
state governments, tend to harbor the propensity to distrust dispute
resolution mechanisms offered by unfamiliar legal institutions. This is
logical as a matter of course from an investor's perspective-lack of
experience or familiarity with the logistics of a foreign judicial system
may place a party at a strategic disadvantage, whether real or
imagined, vis-a-vis the local "other" party to the dispute. Such concerns
may be exacerbated by an investor's lack of confidence in the judicial
independence of certain jurisdictions, or that the system will not
otherwise "favor" a local party.
CONTEXTUAL AND COMPARATIVE APPROACH 468, 481-82 (Dan W. Puchniak et al. eds.,
2017).
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International commercial arbitration, as opposed to court
litigation, is thus envisioned to act as a primary vehicle of cross-border
dispute resolution in relation to disputes arising out of the Belt and
Road transactions (defined broadly as all trade, provision of services,
and investments under or in furtherance of the BRI development). As
stated above, increased trade, investment, and commercial
opportunities arising from the BRI are expected to harbor proportional
increases in commercial disputes as among states and investors. Due
to the transnational nature of commercial dealings promoted under the
Belt and Road, such disputes among states and investors may be
further classified into one of two classes. These are, respectively,
disputes arising (i) within China and (ii) outside China, which may be
further subcategorized depending on the involvement, or lack thereof,
of Chinese parties. International commercial arbitration is expected to
be a favored means of dispute resolution with respect to each of the two
scenarios, for general reasons as given above and elaborated below.
A. Disputes Relating to China
1. Disputes Arising within China
The first scenario deals with BRI-related disputes arising within
China, irrespective of whether either of the disputant parties are
Chinese or China-based. In China, international commercial
arbitration has developed alongside China's economic rise to become a
favored mode of dispute resolution among the business community.49
Two reasons help explain this.
First, as previously mentioned, the availability of international
commercial arbitration as a form of dispute resolution saves foreign
investors from having to traverse a judicial system with which they
lack familiarity. In the context of China, the practical need in pursuing
litigation processes to surmount linguistic differences, navigate
Chinese procedural rules, and instruct legal representatives qualified
to practice in China creates unnecessary complexity and costs in
engaging legal assistance to assist with a convoluted, unfamiliar
process.5 0 Such cost implications, while not wholly dispensed with,
may be significantly reduced by seeking recourse via international
commercial arbitration.
Secondly, the services of established international commercial
arbitration institutions, such as the China International Economic and
Trade Arbitration Commission (CIETAC), are well-regarded and
respected within China. In many cases, international arbitration
49. JINGZHOU TAO, ARBITRATION LAW AND PRACTICE IN CHINA xix-xx (3d ed.
2012).
50. For more details on the value of arbitration, see generally Richard A. Cole,
The Public Policy Exception to the New York Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, 1 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 367 (1985).
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commissions may be deemed more independent and less susceptible to
corruption or protectionism than that perceived to exist in
adjudication.51 For instance, parties are free to select their arbitrator
or arbitrators from a panel list provided by the arbitration institution,
with regard to their nationality, language, or area of expertise as
desired.52 The ability to elect one's arbitrators, and generally to agree
on the procedural conduct of the arbitration in advance, gives the
disputing parties greater control over the arbitration and removes any
unfair advantage, whether real or perceived, given to the Chinese
party.
2. Disputes Arising outside China
Similar considerations, revolving around investor confidence in
the relative autonomy of arbitral procedure as compared to litigation,
apply to disputes in category (ii), disputes outside China. 53 This
scenario is concerned with the Belt and Road disputes based outside of
China, with and without the involvement of Chinese companies.5 4
Again, investors are unlikely to pursue projects where they run the
risk of incurring unwanted costs from lengthy, unfamiliar dispute
resolution processes. ss In addition, more generally, due to the
autonomy of the parties in determining the length of the arbitral
process, arbitration may be preferred as providing a time-effective
mode of dispute resolution.5 6 While judicial statistics indicate that
administration and settlement of civil justice in China is relatively
efficient,5 7 the expected duration of completion of civil suits varies
dramatically among the landscape of the Belt and Road nations. The
international arbitral process may be relied upon, in contrast, as being
generally much shorter as compared to litigation. In this regard, the
parties determine the contents and extent of the discovery process, and
the adducing of expert evidence may be avoided by appointment of an
arbitrator with requisite expertise in the subject matter under dispute.
51. See Yuhua Wang, Court Funding and Judicial Corruption in China, THE
CHINA J. 43, 44 (2013).
52. See, e.g., Arbitrators, CHINA INT'L ECON. & TRADE ARB. COMM'N,
http://www.cietac.org/index.php?g-User&m=Arbitrator&a=index&l=en (last visited
Sept. 14, 2016) [https://perma.cc/NQ29-AF7N] (archived Aug. 24, 2018) (displaying an
arbitrator list).
53. See generally Cole, supra note 50.
54. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 7.
55. Cole, supra note 50, at 367.
56. Id.
57. In 2010, 95 percent of civil cases at first and second instances were concluded
within the statutory time limit of six and three months respectively, with possible
extensions under special circumstances of six and three months respectively. Wang
Yaxin & Fu Yulin, China: Mainland. Efficiency at the Expense of Quality, in CIVIL
LITIGATION IN CHINA AND EUROPE 11 (C.H. van Rhee & Fu Yulin eds., 2014).
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It is also worth noting that arbitral decisions are generally not
appealable except on procedural defects.58
Efficiency of procedure aside, a final consideration for a
commercial preference for arbitration may include the interest of the
parties in preserving business relationships and interests.
Preservation and further continuation of amicable trade dealings are
generally better served by the confidentiality of arbitral process, rather
than the default open system of litigation. " Indeed, it has been
commented that international arbitration eases the barriers of
international trade, by augmenting the security of cross-border and
international transactions."o The opening and expansion of markets
through infrastructural development in the Asia region is precisely the
goal of the BRI.
The suggestion that arbitration will form a primary vehicle for
international commercial dispute resolution under BRI development
has been echoed by scholars and policymakers, who have praised
opportunities for development of arbitration commissions and
institutions in the wake of the BRI.61 It is for this reason, as well as
those established previously, that the regional harmonization of
arbitral enforcement norms would be an integral part of ensuring that
commercial dispute resolution processes run seamlessly regardless of
the nationality of the parties engaged in it.
B. Considerations in Selecting the Forum for International
Commercial Arbitration
Upon selecting arbitration as the preferred mode of commercial
dispute resolution, further consideration must be given by investors
(whether private entities or state-directed ones) as to the jurisdiction
in which arbitration is pursued. As international commercial
arbitration, in addition to allowing parties greater autonomy in
agreeing on the arbitral process in advance, distinguishes between the
"seat" jurisdiction and the "enforcement" jurisdiction, investor
concerns with regards to neutrality may be somewhat assuaged.
However, it remains for investor parties to select an appropriate forum
as the arbitral "seat" for the purpose of dispute resolution.
Such relevant indicators of a jurisdiction's attractiveness as an
arbitration destination for commercial investors may include, inter
alia: (1) whether the jurisdiction adopts the United Nations
Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL) Model Law on
58. MARGARET L. MOSES, PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL
COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 4 (2d ed. 2012).
59. Id.
60. Cole, supra note 50, at 367.
61. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, supra note 7.
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International Commercial Arbitration (Model Law),62 (i.e., is a Model
Law jurisdiction) or its legislation has otherwise been influenced by the
Model Law; (2) the reputation of designated arbitration institutions or
centers in the jurisdiction; (3) the degree of judicial support for
arbitration in the jurisdiction; (4) the degree to which capacity-building
is being undertaken to promote use of arbitration in the jurisdiction;
(5) the recentness of major arbitration legislation and legal
developments in the jurisdiction; (6) the respective level of corruption
and rule of law in the jurisdiction; and (7) the level of foreign direct
investment or commercial activity in the jurisdiction.63 In this regard,
the table below summarizes the performance of key arbitral seats in
Asia.
Table 1: Key Arbitration Indicators of Belt and Road Nations in the
Asia-Pacific Region
Jurisdiction China Hong Singapore Malaysia Philippines Indonesia Vietnam India
(1) Kong




Institution/ Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No
6 6
center (3)
Judicial Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Improv- Improv-
support (4) ing ing
Capacity Yes Yes Yes Yes Improving No Improv- Impro-
building (5) 67 ing68 ving69
62. For an introduction on the Model Law, please refer to the official UNCITRAL
website, UNCITRAL Model Law on International Commercial Arbitration (1985), U.N.
COMM'N ON INT'L TRADE LAW, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitral-texts/
arbitration/1985Modelarbitration.html (last visited Oct. 10, 2018)
[https://perma.cc/N5GV-ZAXU] (archived Aug. 24, 2018) [hereinafter UNCITRAL].
63. Id.
64. For a list of the Model Law adopting jurisdictions, see Status, U.N. COMM'N
ON INT'L TRADE LAw, http://www.uncitral.org/uncitrallen/uncitraltexts/arbitration/
1985Model arbitration-status.htm1 (last visited Oct. 10, 2018) [https://perma.ccXV42-
RA26] (archived Sept. 9, 2018).
65. Although not adopted by China, the Model Law has provided a guiding
reference for the modernization of its arbitration regime.
66. The number of arbitration institutions is miniscule, arbitration in India being
predominantly ad hoc.
67. Public awareness of arbitration still needs to be substantially enhanced in
addition to greater training of arbitration practitioners in order to counter a culture of
litigiousness.
68. More capacity-building and training among judges and lawyers is required.
69. Significantly more capacity-building among judges and lawyers is required.
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Jurisdiction China Hong Singapore Malaysia Philippines Indonesia Vietnam India
(1) Kong




Rule of law 0.48/ 0.77/ 0.82/9 (84) 0.54/56 0.51/70 (35) 0.52/61 0.51/6 n S1 .Ir
index 80 16 (77) (49) (37) (33) (40)
201672 (7) (44)73








Ease of 64.78/ 84.21/4 85.05/2 78.11/23 60.40/99 61.52/91 63.83/ 55.27/




70. Arbitration and Mediation Legislation (Third Party Funding) Ordinance, No.
6 (Amendment), No. 6 (2017) 609 §§ 1-4.
71. Implementing Rules and Regulations issued by the Department of Justice in
2009.
72. WORLD JUSTICE PROJECT, RULE OF LAW INDEX 2016 at 5,
https://worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/RoLlFinal-Digital O.pdf
(last visited Sept. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cc/5MCW-LY26] (archived Sept. 9, 2018). The
first number given is the jurisdiction's overall score, while the second number is its
overall ranking. In arriving at an overall score, the Report takes account of nine factors
and forty-seven sub-factors. Id.
73. See Corruption Perceptions Index 2016, TRANSPARENCY (Jan. 25, 2017),
https://www.transparency.org/news/feature/corruption-perceptions-index_2016#table
[https://perma.cc/6BMY-D3CF] (archived Aug. 25, 2018) (showing a jurisdiction's score
for 2016 under Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index in brackets;
the higher the score, the less corrupt a country is perceived to be).
74. Foreign Direct Investment, THE GLOBAL ECON.,
http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/Foreign-DirectInvestment/ (last visited
Sept. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cfB6BV-4A78] (archived Sept. 9, 2018) [hereinafter FDIJ.
75. See A.T. KEARNEY, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT CONFIDENCE INDEX: GLASS
HALF FULL 3 (2017), https://www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/12116059/2017+FDI
+Confidence+Index+-+Glass+Half+Full.pdfl5ded533-cl5O-4984-acc9-da561b4d96b4
[https://perma.cc/DS8R-QP6A] (archived Sept. 9, 2018); see also FDI, supra note 74
(relevant year indicated in brackets).
76. WORLD BANK GROUP, DOING BUSINESS 2017: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY FOR ALL 7
(2017) http://www.doingbusiness.org/~/media/WBG/DoingBusiness/Documents/Annual-
Reports/EnglishlDB17-Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z99L-B6FF] (archived Sept. 9,
2018). The first number is a jurisdiction's DTF (Distance to Frontier) score, while the
second number is its ranking overall. The DTF score is defined as "the aggregate score
for getting credit and protecting minority investors as well as the regulatory quality
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Jurisdiction China Hong Singapore Malaysia Philippines Indonesia Vietnam India
(1) Kong





Within Belt and Road Asia, it is indicated that Hong Kong, Singapore,
and Malaysia are leading arbitral fora. In particular, Hong Kong and
Singapore, two jurisdictions of similar economic and legal conditions,
have both adopted the relevant internationally recognized legislative
frameworks (Model Law and New York Convention) and implemented
measures and facilities at the governmental and institutional levels to
encourage the greatest possible use of arbitration services by all
disputant parties, including those with little or no connection with
either of the two respective jurisdictions.
As the BRI is not limited to Asia but also reaches Europe and
Africa, it is imagined that similar factors will inform the decisions of
investors in determining the destination for arbitration, although
detailed analysis of the factors is beyond the scope of this Article.
In sum, the concern of investors in determining the seat of
arbitration will depend much on the presumed effectiveness and repute
of arbitration in the jurisdiction. The author foresees that China,
having initiated and significantly funded the BRI, shall continue to
play an indispensable role in leading the same. However, it is expected
that other Belt and Road nations may legitimately become "preferred"
destinations as seats of international arbitration with reference to the
factors discussed above, assuming instrumental roles in furtherance of
the initiative in providing commercial dispute resolution services. In
this way, it is expected that international commercial arbitration
institutions, driven primarily by investor preferences, on-the-ground
factors, and market forces straddling the BRI, will thus fulfill the needs
of increased trade and commercial cooperation among investors.
IV. CONTEMPLATING REGIONAL HARMONIZATION OF THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION IN ASIA TO ARBITRAL ENFORCEMENT UNDER THE BELT AND
ROAD INITIATIVE
Increased volumes of commercial transactions and trade
interactions arising out of BRI development thus present a convincing
case, from a macro perspective, for ensuring that cross-border arbitral
indices from the indicator sets on dealing with construction permits, getting electricity,
registering property, enforcing contracts and resolving insolvency." Id. at 6.
77. See GDP per capita, current dollars, THE GLOBAL EcON.,
http://www.theglobaleconomy.com/rankings/GDP-per-capita-current-dollars/ (last
visited Sept. 9, 2018) [https://perma.cclHM3K-N2DD] (archived Sept. 9, 2018).
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systems are procedurally consistent in providing fair, efficient, and
enforceable resolutions of commercial disputes across the Belt and
Road nations. These efforts tending towards procedural consistency
between national arbitral laws hold regardless of the forum for dispute
resolution ultimately favored by disputing parties, with reference to
the factors discussed in the previous Part.
Such a result may be cultivated through two steps. First, through
the harmonization of international arbitral laws making up the
regulatory framework of the cross-border dispute resolution system
under the BRI development. And second, through harmonization of the
public policy exception-which remains, from the perspective of actual
and prospective investors, the greatest threat to certainty and finality
in arbitral enforcement.
The first step of harmonization of arbitral laws in Asia has largely
already been realized by the adoption over the past decade of the Model
Law and its amendments (see Table 1) and the New York Convention
(the Convention) by many Belt and Road nations.7 8 This presents a
sound foundation upon which the second step may be pursued:
harmonization of the most controversial barrier to arbitral
enforcement-the "unruly horse" of the public policy exception to
enforcement.
As the substantive content of public policy is ultimately a matter
of national courts to decide, investors are inevitably left with a lack of
guidance as to the conditions under which arbitral enforcement may
be refused on the grounds of such public policy. It is contended that,
given the Belt and Road nations' common interests in economic
integration and efficient dispute resolution systems, it is in the
commercial interest of all Belt and Road participants to articulate,
broadly, the public policy exception with similar considerations in
order to promote a level of certainty and consistency. As the originating
jurisdiction and propelling force behind the Belt and Road
development, China's approach to the public policy exception is
arguably one facilitating enforcement and its associated benefits for
commercial certainty within the nation's borders and beyond.
This Part thus considers the conceptual requirements of
"harmonization," before evaluating the progress of arbitral law
harmonization over Belt and Road countries in Asia and the theoretical
underpinnings of prospective harmonization of the public policy
exception. In the meantime, although the public policy exception here
referred to is in the context of international commercial arbitration
(investor-investor), the analysis casts similar light on the public policy
concepts used in the field of investment treaty arbitration (investor-
state).
78. UNCITRAL, supra note 62.
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A. Theoretical Underpinnings of Harmonization
First examining the specific definition to be ascribed to the
"harmonization" of international arbitration law and the public policy
exception, Roderick A. Macdonald's "Three Metaphors of Norm
Migration" provides a useful theoretical framework through which to
understand how international legal norms may be developed, adopted,
or standardized across jurisdictions. 79 In this regard, Macdonald
refers to three analogies or levels of norm propagation: viral
propagation, transplantation, and harmonization.
1. Viral Propagation
At the shallowest level, "viral propagation" refers to the
unplanned self-propagation and perpetuation of external norms within
a system as distinct from the concept of "transplantation."80 While the
latter presupposes the imposition of a set of norms upon a system, the
former describes an "unplanned" mechanism whereby norms grow,
spread, and establish themselves within legal systems of their own
accord. 81 Applied to the goal of harmonizing the public policy
exception, viral propagation describes the norm dissemination of
award-enforcing jurisdictions that have come to apply and develop
certain norms that have proliferated within their legal systems, but
have not adopted wholesale the relevant international standards.8 2
For instance, UNCITRAL legislative guides may be considered to have
been "virally propagated" in that award-enforcing jurisdictions may
apply some, or to some extent, UNCITRAL norms on public policy, but
have not chosen to adopt the entirety of the relevant standards.8 3 Viral
propagation of norms is generally contrary to harmonization because
79. While Macdonald speaks in the particular context of international law reform
and is overtly critical of proponents of "universalist" approaches to norm
implementation, his deconstructive reflections on the suitability of three metaphors-
viral propagation, transplantation and harmonization-to encapsulate modes of norm
migration are helpful, in deepening our understanding of what harmonization requires.
See Roderick A. Macdonald, Three Metaphors of Norm Migration in International
Context, 34 BROOK. J. INT'L L. 603, 607 (2009).
80. Id. at 635-36.
81. Id. at 636. An example of viral propagation may be seen by the adoption of
international arbitral norms into the Chinese arbitral regime. Arbitration Law of the
People's Republic of China did not adopt the Model Law, although along with the arbitral
laws of other nations, formed a frame of reference during its drafting. Indeed, common
elements to each suggest that the drafting of several clauses of the Arbitration Law was
influenced by corresponding provisions of the Model Law, while the Arbitration Law
maintained its own unique characteristics. Thus, while China has not adopted the Model
Law, international arbitral norms have been established and eveloped within its legal
system of their own accord.
82. Id.
83. See generally YVES DEZALAY & BRYANT GARTH, DEALING IN VIRTUE:
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF A
TRANSNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (1998).
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the norms in question are left to develop of their own accord, as opposed
to bringing them in line with other norms or other external standards.
2. Transplantation
At the next level, "transplantation" points to the reform of legal
norms via the wholesale importation of external legal norms to a local
jurisdiction.84 Such transplanted norms, while on their face applying
internationally consistent standards, inevitably take on individual
character in recognition of local conditions, practices, cultures, and
standards. For this reason, they cannot be described as having a
sufficient degree of uniformity to reach "harmonization" between
different jurisdictions. Part of this is attributable to a
"transplantation" effect, which has been noted in premature
harmonization efforts, whereby superficially harmonized laws are
interpreted-and so applied-differently by different jurisdictions due
to different deep-rooted cultures and values.85 The "transplant effect"
manifests particularly in the case of Article V(2)(b)'s public policy
exception under the New York Convention-an example illustrating
that in spite of the adoption of common standards, the norms of
different jurisdictions may still not be "harmonized" due to differing
interpretations of "public policy" and the local circumstances that play
a part in its conception. 86 A deficiency thus remains where
transplanted standards are altered by internal conditions,
84. Id. at 624. Applied to the context of the international arbitration system, an
example of "transplanted" norms may occur where the New York Convention is ratified
by a jurisdiction and applied to the law of the land, but without realizing its legislative
intent. A prime example is the adoption of the UNCITRAL Model Law via the new
Arbitration Ordinance (Cap. 609) in 2011 in Hong Kong, which saw a wholesale
incorporation of the Model Law into statute. The "transplant" nature of Hong Kong's
adoption of the Model Law, however, is marked by its "modifications and supplements"
as included in the Arbitration Ordinance, to reflect specific features of the region's
existing arbitral system and commercial reality. For instance, Part 10 of the Arbitration
Ordinance sets out differing enforcement provisions for "Convention awards" made in
New York Convention states; "Mainland awards" rendered in Mainland China; and
"Macao awards" made in Macau. Such provisions specifically recognize Hong Kong's
status as not a sovereign state, but as a special administrative region of China. Hong
Kong's broadly wholesale adoption and application of the UJNCITRAL Model Law and its
standards may be contrasted with the transplantation of the New York Convention in
India, in which despite its wholesale adoption, did not see its underlying legislative
intentions realized when tested judicially.
85. T. T. Arvind, The 'Transplant Effect'In Harmonization, 59 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
65, 66 (2010).
86. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitral Awards, art.
5(2)(b), June 10, 1958, 330 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter New York Convention]. Recognition
and enforcement of an arbitral award may also be refused if the competent authority in
the country where recognition and enforcement is sought finds that: (a) the subject
matter of the difference is not capable of settlement by arbitration under the law of that
country; or (b) the recognition or enforcement of the award would be contrary to the
public policy of that country.
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inconsistencies in substantive content and application still remain so
as to prevent "true" harmonization of legal norms.
3. Harmonization
At the highest level, true "harmonization" mandates the
naturalization of transplanted standards, and is commonly described
as reforming the law of jurisdictions by bringing a jurisdiction's
national laws into conformity with the equivalent norms of others.8 7
Macdonald notes, and later critiques, the underlying assumption of
global harmonization efforts, which implies that an "existing theme or
melody may have to be changed in order to better accommodate the
harmonic efforts of others."8 8 As to the author, within the context of
international commercial arbitration, "harmonization" of the public
policy exception would require actual synchronization, or the
manufacturing of consistency between the various definitions ascribed
to the public policy concept between different jurisdictions rather than
wholesale transplantation.
As a form of norm propagation, harmonization of legal norms is
closely related to transplantation of legislative standards. Indeed, in
the context of the New York Convention and the Model Law, the
"transplantation" of standards via adoption by state parties is aimed
at homogenizing different arbitral systems. 89 The concept of
harmonization, however, does not necessarily mandate that external
standards be introduced into the arbitral systems to be harmonized.
The purpose of harmonization is simply to bring the laws of states in
conformity with each other, usually for the ends of consistency,
coherence, and legal certainty.9 0 Within the context of the public policy
exception, the author contends that "harmonization" of the exception
does not necessarily require externally-prescribed standards be
adopted by state parties, but that the various considerations under the
87. Macdonald, supra note 79, at 612.
88. Id. An example of norm harmonization may be illustrated using the example
of contract law in the European Union (EU). From 2003 to 2005, the European
Commission adopted an action plan on the harmonization of contract law between EU
member nations. Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on Modernising Company Law and Enhancing Corporate Governance in the
European Union-A Plan to Move Forward, COM (2003) 284 final (May 21, 2003). The
goal of such harmonization was to create a "unified internal market" to facilitate trade
and commercial processes within the EU, achieved via a Common Frame of Reference
(CFR) outlining the fundamental tenets of a "European" contract law, definitions of legal
terminology and model norms. Id. at 8. The adoption of such general guidance standards
by all EU states represents harmonization in its establishment of legally consistent
norms and standards across the European market, with the intended effect of uniform
application regardless of location within the EU. It should be noted that the goal of such
harmonization is to create consistent, but not necessarily identical, standards between
EU states; variations to approaches to state-specific regulation is unproblematic so long
as it is consistent with the general harmonized practice amongst the participant states.
89. New York Convention, supra note 86, at 1.
90. Macdonald, supra note 79, at 625.
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workings of the exception be standardized and normalized. The focus
of "harmonization," then, is compatibility and consistency across
jurisdictions.
B. The Case for Harmonizing Arbitration Laws in the Asia Region
It is contended that harmonization of arbitration laws yields
greatest benefits in terms of commercial certainty, especially in the
light of cross-border economic activity in an increasingly globalized
world. The next subpart therefore seeks to make the case that
harmonization of arbitration laws in the Asia region has largely been
realized, such that a case may be made for pursuing the next step of
harmonizing the public policy exception to arbitral enforcement under
Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.
The author pre-emptively recognizes that the nations touched by
the BRI are not limited to Asian nations, but include approximately
sixty-five economies in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East.9 1 In light
of the vast differences in geo-economics, legal systems, cultural values,
and traditions across these three regions, the contemplation of geo-
legal harmonization of international arbitral enforcement and the
public policy exception will initially be limited in the present Article to
the Belt and Road nations in the Asian region. Specifically, the noted
geo-legal harmonization efforts broadly include the economies making
up China, Russia, 92 southeast Asia, south Asia, and central and
western Asia; but geographically excluding economies in central
Europe, eastern Europe, and the Middle East.9 3 Table 2 illustrates the
Belt and Road nations by region.
91. Country Profiles, supra note 2.
92. While Russia is categorized as being in central and eastern Europe rather
than in Asia, Russia is included in this analysis as being an "Asian" Belt and Road nation
due to its geographical spread over both European and Asian continents.
93. Country Profiles, supra note 2.
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Table 2: The Belt and Road Nations Categorized by Region
Region Belt and Road Nations Number
China China 1
Southeast Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, 11
Asia Myanmar, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Timor-
Leste, Vietnam
South Asia Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, 7
Pakistan, Sri Lanka
Central and Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, 11
Western Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan
Total Belt and Road Nations in Asia: 30
Middle East Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, 15
and Africa Lebanon, Oman, Palestine, Qatar, Saudi Arabia,
Syrian Arab Republic, Turkey, United Arab Emirates,
Yemen
Central and Albania, Belarus, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Bulgaria, 20
Eastern Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Europe Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Montenegro, Poland,
Romania, Russia, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Ukraine
Total Belt and Road Nations outside of Asia: 35
Total: 65
As noted previously, arbitration laws within the Asian region have
largely reached harmonization due to the adoption of the New York
Convention and the Model Law by most Asian nations along the Belt
and Road. As of April 2018, 159 and 109 jurisdictions worldwide have
acceded to the New York Convention and the Model Law,
respectively.94 Tables 3 and 4 set out the Belt and Road nations that
have acceded to the New York Convention and the Model Law,
respectively. Table 3 shows that, twenty-eight out of thirty Belt and
Road nations in Asia are New York Convention member states. Table
4 shows that twenty out of thirty Belt and Road nations in Asia have
adopted the Model Law.
94. Contracting States, N.Y. CONVENTION, http://www.newyorkconvention.org/
countries (last visited Nov. 3, 2018) [https://perma.cc/S4W7-KMCW] (archived Aug. 25,
2018) (member jurisdictions of the New York Convention); Status, supra note 64
(member jurisdictions of Model Law).
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Table 3: Adoption of the New York Convention by Belt and Road
Nations
China/Russia China, Russia 2
Southeast Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, 10
Asia Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, Vietnam
South Asia Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, Sri Lanka 6
Central and Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, 10
Western Asia Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Mongolia, Tajikistan,
Uzbekistan
Total Belt and Road Nations: 28
Table 4: Adoption of the Model Law by Belt and Road Nations
Region Belt and Road Nations Adopting the Model Law Number
China/Russia Russia 1
Southeast Brunei, Cambodia, Malaysia, Myanmar, Philippines, 8
Asia Singapore, Thailand, Timor-Leste
South Asia Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Sri Lanka 5
Central and Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Iran, Mongolia, 6
Western Asia Turkmenistan
Total Belt and Road Nations: 20
The widespread adoption of common international commercial
arbitration norms represents at least a positive starting point for
further harmonization efforts of arbitral enforcement norms among the
Belt and Road countries. In particular, the ratification of both the New
York Convention and the Model Law by the Russian Federation makes
it conceivable that central Asian economies, particularly those
previously of the Soviet Union, will readily follow any further
harmonization efforts.9 5 As such, a foundation already exists upon
which harmonization of the public policy exception to arbitral
enforcement under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention may be
contemplated.
C. The Public Policy Exception under Article V(2)(b) of the New York
Convention
Under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention, recognition or
enforcement of a foreign arbitral award may be declined, where such
recognition or enforcement is considered by a court of the member state
95. These "post-Soviet" Belt and Road nations are located in Asia, and may
include Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, in addition to the Russian Federation.
Belt and Road Nations Adopting the New York Convention NmeRegion
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to the Convention to contravene its public policy. 9 6 As the peripheries
of "public policy" are neither restricted nor defined under the
Convention, member states are essentially free to determine the
substantive contents and limits of their nation-specific, albeit
"international" rather than "domestic," conceptions of public policy.97
In this regard, James Fry contends that such notion of public policy to
be applied by states ought not to be obligatorily "supranational" or
"truly international." By this, Fry suggests that the public policy
applied refers to those values considered "quasi-universal" amongst
states, rather than simply those values of the individual states
themselves. These "quasi-universal" values, however, are still
determined by the state-albeit that they may legitimately reflect
regional or international norms and concerns at its discretion.98
The controversy of the "free-for-all" public policy exception in the
private international law jurisprudence is rooted in the fact that it
bestows upon national judicial systems ultimate control over
recognition and enforcement of perhaps otherwise valid foreign
arbitral awards, with all the potentials of unpredictability and
irregularity in its application. It has been noted that the power of
refusal to recognize or enforce arbitral awards goes "to the heart" of the
Convention.9 The significance lies in that the primary objective of the
New York Convention was to advance collective legislative standards
for the enhanced recognition and enforcement of cross-border arbitral
awards.100 A broad interpretation of the public policy exception would
thus frustrate the functioning and effectiveness of the Convention, and
by extension, efficient operation of the international arbitration
system.1 0 Even within national boundaries, the vagueness of Article
V(2)(b)'s exception is encapsulated in the general dearth of statutory
definitions for public policy.1 02 In this regard, Fry astutely argues that
a uniform approach of enforcing arbitral awards may compromise the
strength of the system in attractive negative implications for ease of
enforcement (for instance, where refusal was based on a procedural
defect applicable not only to one, but suddenly all states) and the
96. New York Convention, supra note 86, art. 5(2)(b).
97. While national courts do not always draw a clear distinction between
"domestic" and "international" concepts of public policy, a wider-ranging "international"
public policy was endorsed by the International Law Association (ILA) in 2003. See
Pierre Mayer & Audley Sheppard, Final ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 19 ARB. INT'L 249, 251 (2003).
98. James D. Fry, D6sordre Public International under the New York Convention:
Wither Truly International Public Policy, 8 CHINESE J. INT'L L. 81, 82 (2009).
99. Cole, supra note 50, at 372.
100. New York Convention, supra note 86, at 1.
101. Id.
102. A recent report from the International Bar Association (IBA) Subcommittee
on Recognition and Enforcement of Arbitration found that of over forty jurisdictions
surveyed, just two jurisdictions (Australia and the United Arab Emirates) had developed
explicit statutory definitions for the concept of "public policy." See IBA SUBCOMM. ON
RECOGNITION AND ENF'T OF ARBITRAL AWARDS, REPORT ON THE PUBLIC POLICY
EXCEPTION IN THE NEW YORK CONVENTION 2 (2015) [hereinafter IBA SUBCOMMITTEE].
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ability of states to regulate events and transactions within their
jurisdiction (as a marker of their sovereignty).103 Nonetheless, the
dearth of a common standard for what is considered by states to be
sufficiently fundamental to constitute national "public policy" means
that stakeholders presumably have little guidance as to whether their
awards will be enforced.
D. Common Themes and Grounds Belying the Application of the
Public Policy Exception
In this regard, in 2015, the International Bar Association (IBA),104
following a survey of country reports on the public policy exception,
recently observed that while different jurisdictions differ in their
formulations of international public policy, three subcategories of
norms are generally included. 105 These are: first, fundamental
principles relating to justice and morality; second, rules serving
fundamental political, social, and economic interests of the nation; and
third, international obligations of nations towards other nations or
international organizations.0 6 As such, the "minimum" content of a
state party's public policy would lie in the fundamental principles or
values underscoring its legal order and social fabric-whatever these
normative standards and values are determined to be. It is thus clear
that judicial systems do not generally allow the "public policy"
exception to be trotted out as a mere excuse, where all other lines of
attack fail-as suggested cynically in Richardson v. Mellish, in which
it was commented that "[public policy] is never argued at all but when
other points fail" but whose issue must at least reach a minimum
standard of fundamentality.0 7
However, in this respect, Judith Gill and David Baker, in referring'
to the IBA report to identify common themes belying public policy
decisions in national courts, note that even beyond an unspoken
consensus that public policy issues must be sufficiently fundamental
to a nation's normative values, there exists a divergence as among
different legal systems and cultures in such expression of the degree of
violation of "public policy" required to mandate intervention.0 8 For
instance, whereas civil law systems couch public policy considerations
in terms of "the basic principles or basic ideas of the legal system of our
103. Fry, supra note 98, at 124.
104. Not to be confused with the International Law Association (ILA), references
to which will be made in subsequent paragraphs. As both reports of the IBA and ILA
engage in comparative research as to the application of the public policy exception among
different jurisdiction, the merits of the conclusions of both will be used as appropriate in
this article.
105. Mayer & Sheppard, supra note 97, at 255.
106. Id.
107. Judith Gill QC & David Baker, The Public Policy Exception Under Article
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country" and going to "the very fundamentals of public and economic
life," common law systems tend to refer to specific core values such as
considerations going to the "fundamental norms of justice and
fairness." 109 While Gill and Baker categorize such definitions as
simply creating the "overall impression that the values concerned have
to be 'fundamental' to the particular State,"110 it is worth noting the
discrepancies between the example formulations of common law and
civil law jurisdictions-with possibilities for further alternative
formulations under different legal systems themselves posing a source
of indeterminacy as to the definition of "public policy."
E. Grounds for Successful Invocation of the Public Policy Exception
The IBA recommends that indeterminacy of the definition of
"public policy" can be mitigated by dividing it into two dimensions: the
procedural and the substantive.'
"Procedural" public policy is concerned with upholding formal
justice between two arbitrating parties-for instance, relating to the
right of due process, or refusing the enforcement of awards obtained by
fraud or falsification.112 In this regard, Gill and Baker note that the
content of procedural violations engaging the public policy exception to
arbitral enforcement are wide-ranging. Such content may range from
virtually universally accepted grounds (such as fraud or falsification of
documents) to grounds adopted by the "majority" of jurisdictions (such
as contravention of the res judicata norm), and indeed to those grounds
accepted only by a "minority" of states (such as contravention of the
common law lis pendens doctrine).1 1 3 In any event, it is noted by the
IBA report that "procedural" public policy grounds are more likely to
succeed as compared to "substantive grounds."
In contrast, "substantive" public policy involves value-laden
norms, which inform the interests of public policy. 114 In this regard,
the IBA report separates substantive public policy into five main
categories: (a) antitrust and competition law; (b) pacta sunt servanda,
or the principle that "agreements must be kept"; (c) equality of
creditors in insolvency situations; (d) state immunity and prohibition
of punitive damages; and (e) prohibition of excessive interest.1 5 Gill
and Baker further note that in relation to the "substantive" categories,
109. Id. In addition, Gill QC and Baker identify a third combined approach
enunciated by the Supreme Court of India, which stipulated that enforcement of a
foreign arbitral award may be refused on public policy grounds where it was inconsistent
with the "fundamental policy" of Indian law, Indian national interests (civil law concept)
or "justice or morality" (a common law concept). Id.
110. Id. at 76.
111. IBA SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 15-17.
112. Id. at 15.
113. Gill QC & Baker, supra note 107, at 78.
114. IBA SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 17.
115. Gill QC & Baker, supra note 107, at 78.
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however they be defined, public policy may be judicially influenced by
constitutional and political issues, as well as by legal systems.116 it
may be observed that there is a greater divergence between states as
to agreed grounds of "substantive" public policy.
It is noted by some authors that "public policy" under Article
V(2)(b) would in practice not necessarily encapsulate all procedural
public policy concerns, most already specifically accounted for in
Article V(1).11 7 It is however noted that the stipulated bars to arbitral
enforcement in Article V(1) cover far from all possible procedural
defects in arbitral procedure, such that Article V(2)(b) may be
considered a "catch-all" for other procedural considerations, in addition
to substantive norms.1 18
In any event, as will be discussed later, "procedural" public policy
based on securing fair procedure is often viewed as less contentious
than "substantive" public policy, which is concerned with certain
norms based on state-specific priorities or other value judgments.
F. Harmonizing the "Public Policy Exception" under Article V(2)(b) of
the New York Convention
It is noted in the IBA's report that fears over the "indeterminacy"
of the public policy exception under Article V(2)(b) may be more
academic than factually based. 119 Due to the narrow construction
given to the public policy exception by the courts of most member
states, coupled with a pro-enforcement approach of many jurisdictions,
even where the exception is raised, it is far more often rejected than
not.120 This trend of practice is in line with the International Law
Association's (ILA) 2003 general recommendation that "international
commercial arbitration should be respected save in exceptional
circumstances"121 as contained in the ILA's Interim and Final Reports
on Public Policy as a Bar to Enforcement of International Arbitral
Awards, which are increasingly considered guidelines of best
international practice.122 As of 2017, George Bermann's most recent
wide-ranging survey of the interpretation and application of the New
York Convention by the courts of forty-four jurisdictions likewise
identifies the trend of violations of public policy being construed
116. Id. at 79. In particular, Gill QC and Baker note that the principles of Muslim
Sharia Law impact upon such jurisdictions' view of public policy. Id.
117. Fry, supra note 98, at 92-93.
118. Id.
119. IBA SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 12.
120. Id.
121. Mayer & Sheppard, supra note 97.
122. INT'L COUNCIL FOR COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION (ICCA), ICCA's GUIDE TO THE
INTERPRETATION OF THE 1958 NEW YORK CONVENTION: A HANDBOOK FOR JUDGES 107
(2011).
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narrowly, much being limited to the violations of the "most
fundamental notions of morality and justice."123
Still, from the commercial perspective, the potential of
enforcement uncertainties which arise with respect to public policy
cases are sufficient to compromise commercial certainty and investor
confidence, with adverse effects on the commission of commercial
transactions and business in foreign jurisdictions. It is noted that a
pro-enforcement approach to arbitral enforcement, as aforementioned,
appears to be the judicial practice in China.124 There, in the timeframe
spanning from 2000 to 2012, of twelve cases concerning or including
public policy issues, just one succeeded on the basis of contravention of
public policy under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.12 5 As
the anticipated primary economic force driving the BRI development,
China's partiality approach towards facilitating commercial
endeavors, except in cases involving elements significantly affecting
fundamental national concerns, is expected to set the tone for any
harmonization of the public policy exception.
In this regard, it is interesting to note David Adam Friedman's
conclusions in relation to the public policy defense in the context of
American contract law. He analyzed a sample of public policy defense
cases which show that public policy cases invoking a specific statute or
regulation (48 percent of the cases sampled) have a 59 percent success
rate, in contrast to public policy cases which either (i) refer to case law
(15 percent) or (ii) make a "broad, general appeal" to public policy as a
defense (33 percent)-which succeed just 31 percent of the time.1 26
The takeaway from this appears to be that specific public policy
concerns (i.e., those which are clearly defined or based in precedent)
have a higher rate of success in public policy defense, as compared to
those that refer to a vaguer notion of public policy. This would be
illustrative of an appropriate balance of judicial oversight over arbitral
enforcement in the context of public policy-to be applied where clearly
defined so as to give reassurance to legislative and commercial
certainty.
In light of international commercial arbitration being utilized as
the primary mode of commercial dispute resolution for the Belt and
Road transactions, and an existing high level of harmonization of
international arbitration norms among the Belt and Road nations in
Asia, coupled with the commercial cost-reducing interest in plugging
any real or imagined uncertainties relating to the public policy
123. RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF FOREIGN ARBITRAL AWARDS: THE
INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF THE NEW YORK CONVENTION BY NATIONAL
COURTS 60 (George A. Bermann ed., 2017) [hereinafter RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT].
124. See generally He Qisheng, Public Policy in Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral
Awards in the Supreme People's Court of China, 43 HONG KONG L.J. 1037 (2013).
125. See id. at 1037 (evidencing a "pro-enforcement" approach generally taken by
the Chinese judiciary).
126. David Adam Friedman, Bringing Order to Contracts Against Public Policy, 39
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 563, 567 (2012).
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exception, the conditions are ripe for taming the "unruly horse" of
public policy.
V. DETAILS OF HARMONIZING THE PUBLIC POLICY EXCEPTION UNDER
THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE
The following Part provides substantive details as to how to
harmonize the public policy exception under the BRI. First,
harmonization of the public policy exception is contextualized within
the theoretical debate as to its normative foundations. Second, the
experiences of the EU and OHADA are drawn upon in, respectively,
harmonizing and uniformizing the public policy exception, before a
''negative list" approach is taken in fleshing out its substantive
contents in the particular context of the BRI. Finally, the challenges of
taming the public policy exception are evaluated.
A. Competing Paradigms: Seat Theory versus Delocalization Theory
An appeal for harmonization of the public policy exception invites
scrutiny of the two main contending theories underpinning the
normative foundations upon which international commercial
arbitration ought to develop. Known respectively as "seat theory" and
"delocalization theory," each paradigm addresses the issue of whether
the fact that parties have opted for a particular jurisdictional "seat" for
their arbitral proceedings means that the applicable national
procedural laws, or lex arbitri, of the jurisdiction ought to govern the
arbitral process.2 7 On a more abstract level, each theory may be
considered to be concerned with the source of legal validity of arbitral
awards.128 While orthodox state practice has thus far tended towards
the adoption of the seat theory,129 it is argued that delocalization of
arbitral norms is preferred in light of homogenization of the
international arbitration system.
1. Seat Theory
Seat theory advances the primacy of the territorial "seat" of
international commercial arbitration proceedings, whereby relevant
national procedural laws of the "seat" are considered to hold an
automatic and legitimate mandate to supervise arbitral
proceedings.1 3 0 The arbitral process is thus shaped by legal standards
specific to the location of the arbitration. This forms the normative
127. Masood Ahmed, The Influence of the Delocalization and Seat Theories upon
Judicial Attitudes Towards International Commercial Arbitration, 77 ARB. 406, 407
(2011).
128. Matthew Barry, The Role of the Seat in International Arbitration: Theory,
Practice, and Implications for Australian Courts, 32 J. INT'L ARB. 289, 295 (2015).
129. Ahmed, supra note 127, at 412-17.
130. Id. at 412-13.
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backdrop, against which the parties determine the procedure of their
arbitral proceedings. Enforcement courts must defer to decisions of the
seat, unless to do so would be repugnant to the public policy of the
enforcement jurisdiction under Article V(2)(b) of the New York
Convention.
Given the traditional Westphalian focus on national sovereignty,
a substantial number of states and their judicial systems have both
explicitly and implicitly adopted the seat theory, conferring on their
courts a mandate to supervise arbitral proceedings via state-specific
lex arbitri.13 Under this paradigm, a party seeking to enforce a cross-
border arbitral award is subjected to two sets of controls. Arbitration
proceedings are first governed by the lex arbitri of the seat-in addition
to the arbitral rules and procedures chosen by the parties. 132
Afterwards, a second set of controls is enforced by an alternate
jurisdiction in that its courts exercise the jurisdiction's own public
policy considerations as to recognition and enforcement. 133 It is
contended by this author that this "dual" system is inefficient and
uncertain, in that it creates a superfluous hurdle for parties who have
obtained an arbitral award in one jurisdiction, but seek to enforce it in
another. "Delocalization theory" provides a potential solution for this
particular predicament.
2. Delocalization Theory
Delocalization theory envisions an international commercial-
arbitration system liberated from the influence of the lex arbitri of the
arbitral seat.13 4 In other words, parties are free to determine the form
and procedure of their arbitral proceedings without regard to
adherence to the law of arbitration within their "seat" jurisdiction. This
has been couched in the language of the existence of a "universal" lex
arbitri, such that all laws regulating arbitral process are the same.13 5
Under the delocalization paradigm, the only national legal
consideration that legitimately plays a role in the arbitration process
is the public policy of the enforcement court.1 36 In contrast to the dual
control imposed first by the lex arbitri and then the enforcement court,
the sole point of control-with its public policy considerations-is the
enforcement jurisdiction.1 3 7
131. Id.
132. See Alastair Henderson, Lex Arbitri, Procedural Law and the Seat of
Arbitration, SING. ACAD. L. J. 886, 887 (2014).
133. See Andrew Barraclough & Jeff Waincymer, Mandatory Rules of Law in
International Commercial Arbitration, 6 MELBOURNE J. INT'L L. 205, 206 (2005).
134. Ahmed, supra note 127, at 408-410.
135. Alan Redfern & Martin Hunter, The Law Governing the Arbitration, in LAW
AND PRACTICE OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL ARBITRATION 89 (2004).
136. Id. at 90.
137. Id.
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The arbitral process, to use the terminology of proponent Jan
Paulsson, unlike under the seat theory, is not thus "anchored" within
the national norms of an arbitral seat, but both "floats" and "drifts" in
its capability of being recognized by arbitral systems in other
jurisdictions.1 3 8 Delocalization theories thus naturally promote party
autonomy, allowing greater leeway for parties to determine the
resolution of their dispute free of the constraints of national public
policy. 139 It is noted that the delocalization theory can also be applied
not only to the arbitral process, but to the arbitral award itself.140
Concerned with the recognition of arbitral awards, a "delocalized"
system entails one where a declaration of invalidity of an award in one
jurisdiction's court is limited and unenforceable in other
jurisdictions.14 1
3. The Relationship between "Delocalization" and "Harmonization"
"Delocalization theory" in international commercial arbitration
thus precludes the operation of the lex arbitri, or national procedural
law.14 2 Essentially, the spirit of "delocalization" is to reduce, as far as
possible, the role of national laws on international arbitration-
whether on the arbitral process or at the enforcement stage. The
underlying rationale of delocalization is thus twofold. First, to increase
party autonomy over the arbitral process by precluding the automatic
application of the seat's lex arbitri;s4 3 and second, to limit enforcement
challenges by ensuring that the only relevant considerations for
enforcement are those of the enforcement jurisdiction. 144 This
increases certainty for users of the arbitral system.
"Harmonization" refers to a different legal concept, a phenomenon
whereby the norms of different jurisdictions are made consistent with
each other.14 5 In the context of international commercial arbitration,
harmonization of different jurisdictional norms relating to the
enforcement process refers to the homogenization of enforcement
standards in the international commercial arbitration system.146 It is
contended that harmonization of the public policy exception, as
discussed below, is facilitated by a "delocalized" system whereby the
considerations for non-enforcement aken account of by enforcement
138. Ahmed, supra note 127, at 408; see also generally Jan Paulsson, Arbitration
Unbound: Award Detached from the Law of its Country of Origin, 30 INT'L & COMIP. L.Q.
358 (1981).
139. Ahmed, supra note 127, at 409.
140. Pippa Read, Delocalization of International Commercial Arbitration: Its





145. Id. at 199.
146. Id.
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courts are reduced due to delocalization.147 Although "delocalization"
and "harmonization" are distinct concepts arising in two different
contexts,148 they are connected in the context of arbitration in that
both concepts work towards greater certainty in the recognition and
enforcement of international awards.149 Where enforcement courts no
longer have to be concerned with breaches of state-specific lex arbitri
in the seat even prior to considerations of procedural and substantive
fairness of the chosen arbitral procedure itself, "harmonization" of the
public policy exception will be made easier.
B. Drawing from the Experiences of the EU and OHADA
The substantial levels of harmonization of arbitral regulations
existing in the Asia region pave the way for the practical viability of
harmonization of the public policy, for reasons discussed above. In this
respect, different approaches of the EU and OHADA to incorporating
regional interests into their respective understandings of public policy
provide valuable precedent and reference for public policy
harmonization in context of the BRI in Asia, as considered below.
It is noted that the countries under the BRI are not yet
economically integrated, although it cherishes the good wishes of being
so connected. As such, the EU and OHADA are not for these purposes
perfect comparators. The EU, despite its useful enunciation of a
"regional public policy" and unlike OHADA and the Belt and Road
region, exists not solely for the purpose of trade, but acts further as a
political bloc dealing with matters as diverse as human rights and
regional security. 150 It is, however, considered that the lengthy
experience of the EU in matters of economic integration is unparalleled
by any other strategic international alliance in the world. In the same
vein, the approach of OHADA of absolute uniformity of business laws-
and by extension, public policy-as opposed to harmonization across a
host of countries with different national laws and economic
considerations is not identical to the Belt and Road region.
Nonetheless, their single focus on economic integration-as under the
BRI-makes them an eligible comparator.
1. "EU Public Policy" of EU Member States
A key implication of sovereignty, accounted for under Article
V(2)(b) of the Convention, is that EU member states are judicially free
to determine the substantive considerations constituting their
147. Id.
148. "Harmonization" of arbitral norms does not preclude the operation of lex
arbitri, simply that grounds for non-enforcement of awards such as those based on lex
arbitri are made consistent. In contrast, "delocalization" argues for the complete removal
of lex arbitri as irrelevant considerations.
149. Read, supra note 140, at 199.
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jurisdiction's "[international] public policy." 15 1 However, due to the
supranational nature of EU laws and directives vis-a-vis EU member
states, individual member states are further required to take EU law
into consideration when determining the substantive content of public
policy. 152 Notably, in Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton
International NV, the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU)
specifically ruled that where an EU member state's refusal to recognize
and/or enforce an arbitral award occurs on public policy grounds,
violation of "EU public policy" must also be treated as a valid ground
for annulment. 153 The European Parliament itself affirms the
existence of an "EU public policy" as considered in a number of cases
by the CJEU.154
The EU's experience indicates that the adoption and inclusion of
"regional" public policy considerations by member states is compatible
with the free determination of sovereign states of the contents of their
jurisdiction-specific conception of public policy. It is thus conceivable
that an "Asian public policy" similarly encapsulating core Asian
interests may be agreed and adopted as part of the national conception
of public policy by individual nations within the Belt and Road
network. Conceivably, a distinction may be made on the basis that the
relationship of member states to the EU is akin to a politically-
integrated federal union.15 5 In contrast, there is no political affiliation
among the Belt and Road nations notwithstanding their geographical
proximity and shared economic goals. Nonetheless, political
integration ought not to constitute a prerequisite for inclusion of a
regional public policy; the presence of common goals or interests should
be sufficient.
The substantive contents of "EU public policy" remain
indeterminate. While the CJEU has indicated that individual EU laws
and regulations may constitute "EU public policy" in the specific case,
it has yet to enunciate exactly which provisions, or which classes of
provisions, are likely to form part of regional public policy. 156 It is
noted that while the EU promotes incorporation of an "EU public
policy" into "national" public policy, a regionally "harmonized" public
policy is not advanced by the EU as a whole.'5 7 The rationale behind
the approach of the CJEU is to ensure that civil claims based upon EU
151. George A. Bermann, Reconciling European Union Law Demands with the
Demands of International Arbitration, 34 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 1193, 1201 (2011).
152. Id.
153. Eco Swiss China Time Ltd. v. Benetton Int'l NV, Case C-126/97, 1999 E.C.R.
1-3055, ¶ 37.
154. TONY COLE ET AL., LEGAL INSTRUMENTS AND PRACTICE OF ARBITRATION IN
THE EU 15 (2014), http://www.europarl.europa.eulRegDataetudes/STUD/2015/509988/
IPOLSTU%282015%29509988-EN.pdf [https://perma.cc/8TF3-XB35] (archived Sept.
11, 2018).
155. Sergio Fabbrini, Comparing Democratic Models, in WHICH EUROPEAN
UNION? 187 (2015).
156. COLE ET AL., supra note 154.
157. Id.
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laws in individual member states would be treated no less favorably as
compared to claims based upon domestic laws.15 8 As such, there is no
implication that the substantive contents of public policy
considerations of individual EU nations must be consistent among the
common market.
As discussed above, the enunciation of a "harmonized" public
policy exception within the Asia region serves a different purpose in
light of the BRI. Mitigating the indeterminacy of jurisdiction-specific
public policies through harmonization of their substantive contents
promotes the certainty needed to allow the BRI to flourish.
2. A "Uniform" Public Policy Under OHADA
Next considered is the analogous experience of OHADA, which has
taken a different approach from the EU in instituting a "uniform"
public policy as part of their regional implementation of uniform
business laws. It should be noted at the outset that the application of
uniform public policy under OHADA regime is unrelated to Article
V(2)(b) of the Convention.1 5 9
Formed under the 1993 OHADA Treaty, OHADA is an alliance of
seventeen western and central African countries, which aims to
implement a modernized cross-border egime of uniform business laws
and institutions across the participating countries.160 As the vast
majority of OHADA nations are connected as historical French
colonies, the OHADA laws similarly derive from French law.161 Akin
to the infrastructural and economic development motives belying the
BRI, the purpose of the unified OHADA laws is to bolster much-needed
economic development via the greater attraction of foreign investment
in the sub-Saharan African region. 162 Unification of regional
commercial laws, supported by OHADA's supranational court, 163
strengthens regional rule of law and is geared at increasing investor
confidence by cultivating certainty and bolstering easy accessibility to
OHADA's shared business environment.
OHADA's 1999 Uniform Act on Arbitration (Uniform Act)
provided an updated, unified set of arbitration laws for the seventeen
OHADA nations. 164 Articles 26 and 31 deal respectively with
"international public policy" as one of the six grounds for invalidity of,
158. Bermann, supra note 151.
159. Article V2(b) will only apply to those OHADA member states that have
ratified the New York Convention.
160. Claire Moore Dickerson, Harmonizing Business Laws in Africa: OHADA
Calls the Tune, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNATL L. 17, 19 (2005).
161. Id. at 21.
162. Id. at 19-20.
163. The OlHADA laws are judicially enforced and interpreted by the
supranational Cour Commune de Justice et d'Arbitrage (CCJA).
164. Francis Ulrigh Ndinga, The Features of the Arbitration Proceedings Under the
OHADA Uniform Act on Arbitration Law, 1 GLOBAL SCHOLARS J. L. & CONFLICT RESOL.
1, 1-2 (2014).
2018] 1341
VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW
and the sole ground for refusal to recognize and/or enforce, an arbitral
award. 165 As "public policy" refers to OHADA's "collective" public
policy of the member states as a unit, and the Uniform Act applies to
all OHADA jurisdictions, the substantive contents of public policy are
not simply harmonized, but actually identical in the seventeen OHADA
nations.166 The significance of Articles 26 and 31 of the Uniform Act is
that as long as an award rendered in an OHADA seat jurisdiction is
not void due to contravention of OHADA's public policy, 167 it is
recognized and enforceable in any other OHADA jurisdiction.168
OHADA's uniform regime under the Uniform Act is aimed at
maximizing efficiency and commercial certainty for the rendering and
enforcement of arbitral awards in the region.169 However, as with the
EU public policy, little legislative guidance is provided as to the
substantive content of OHADA public policy and is decided on a case-
by-case basis. To further the ends of uniformity, enforcement courts
will generally have to accept the conclusions on validity and
subsequent order for recognition in the seat jurisdiction, with appeals
to OHADA's supranational court, the Common Court of Justice and
Arbitration.170
It must be emphasized that OHADA's uniform "international
public policy" implies identical considerations amongst all OHADA
member states. A "uniform" public policy is more stringent than a
"harmonized" public policy in that while the former demands complete
uniformity in substantive content, the latter requires only that they be
mutually consistent. A "harmonized" public policy allows individual
nations leeway to tailor their public policy to the particular
jurisdictional circumstances, provided that its application does not
conflict with the nation-specific public policy of other jurisdictions.
OHADA's uniform "public policy" regime is facilitated, aside from a
common interest in regional economic development, by their shared
historical experience and French law-based legal systems of many
OHADA nations.171 However, a lack of similar homogeneity among
the Belt and Road nations would create virtually insurmountable
difficulties in establishing a unified conception of public policy. As
such, a "harmonized" rather than a "uniform" approach in Asian public
policy may be more appropriate as a starting point.
165. Organization for the Harmonization of Business Law in Africa [OHADA],
Uniform Act on Arbitration, art. 26 & 31, (Mar. 11, 1999) [hereinafter OHADA].
166. Emilia Onyema, Enforcement of Arbitral Awards in Sub-Sahara Africa, 26
ARB. INT'L 115, 121 (2010).
167. OHADA, supra note 165.
168. Id. Indeed, an order of recognition and enforcement granted by the court of
an OHADA member state only has to be registered with the courts of the second OHADA
member state in which enforcement is sought. See Onyema, supra note 166, at 115.
169. See generally Onyema, supra note 166 (examining "the issues surrounding
the enforcement of arbitral awards by national courts in various countries within the
Sub-Sahara region").
170. Id.
171. Dickerson, supra note 160, at 19.
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C. Substantive Contents of a Harmonized Public Policy
Having shown that a region-specific "harmonized" public policy
may be adopted across the Belt and Road nations to further the
common economic interests of the Asian region, the next step is to
consider its substantive contents. As noted in the IBA report, there are
certain violations of public policy that appear common to most nations,
regardless of variation in legal culture, political framework, and level
of economic development.1 7 2 For instance, procedural irregularities in
the arbitral process amounting to the violation of the right of a party
to be heard or to present the case are virtually universally considered
contrary to agreed standards of fairness, and thus, public policy.1 73
Some substantive matters, such as corruption and fraud, are similarly
regarded by most nations to contravene public policy. 174 It would thus
be possible for the Belt and Road nations to agree upon a non-
exhaustive, but harmonized set of commonly agreed public policy
considerations. By way of illustration, the discussion below sets out
common examples of procedural and substantive matters suggested by
the ILA to contravene public policy, which may be incorporated into a
shared Asian public policy framework in international arbitration.
1. Procedural Contraventions of Public Policy
Procedural public policy contraventions involve defects in the
arbitral procedure which adversely impact the availability of due
process. Non-contentious matters constituting such contravention may
include: evidence of fraud or corruption in the arbitral process;175 as
well as violations, generally, of due process.176 Subject to agreement
amongst the Belt and Road nations, other grounds of procedural
contravention of public policy may include, for example, specific
procedural issues such as: evidence of arbitrator partiality; 177
irrational dissonance between the facts and award; 7 8 or decisions
made in the absence of reasons.179
It is noted here that Article V(1) of the New York Convention
already deals with the refusal of recognition and enforcement of
arbitral awards on a number of due process and procedural grounds;
inter alia, notice of arbitral proceedings and compliance of arbitral
process with pre-existing arbitral agreement or laws of the seat
172. IBA SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 14.
173. Id. at 15.
174. Id. at 16.
175. Audley Sheppard, Interim ILA Report on Public Policy as a Bar to
Enforcement of International Arbitral Awards, 19 ARB. INT'L 217, 238 (2010).
176. Id. at 239.
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jurisdiction.18 0 In the same vein as public policy harmonization, it
should be possible to develop standards of due process and consistency
in the way procedural issues are approached in Belt and Road
jurisdictions, as there is already significant overlap in those categories
of procedural irregularities considered under individual judicial
systems to constitute public policy contraventions.18 1
2. Substantive Contraventions of Public Policy
Substantive public policy contraventions concern the subject
matter of the arbitration, protection of which may be considered
contrary to public policy. Such "proscribed" matters frequently differ
amongst different jurisdictions without common ground, due to
variations in policy concerns underlying societal values. 182 The
general exception concerns awards which allow the commission of
activities universally considered to be illegal or morally
objectionable,18 3 such as those relating to drug trafficking, corruption,
or fraud.184
However, as discussed in the context of "EU public policy," while
substantive prohibitions may vary depending on the governance
policies of individual states, it is submitted that fundamental norms,
values, and interests shared over an alliance of nations may form part
of an individual jurisdiction's public policy. For instance, Article 81 of
the Treaty Establishing the European Community, which prohibits
practices restricting competition among member states, was ruled by
the CJEU contrary to regional "EU public policy." 185 As fair
competition laws are integral to the facilitation of trade and the proper
functioning of the free markets, their protection is considered a matter
of EU public policy.1 8 6 Such a consideration protects both the economic
interests of individual EU member states, as well the European
Community as a regional entity.
It is ventured that similar norms and considerations may be
applied to the Asian region in regard of the promotion of the economic
goals of the BRI. The fundamental interest of the BRI, aside from the
development of regional infrastructure, is the bolstering of cross-
border commercial and trade cooperation amongst the Belt and Road
nations. 187 Regional prosperity, envisaged as an interest of all
jurisdictions in the Belt and Road Asian region, may be facilitated
through the application of harmonized public policy. Such substantive
norms in the harmonized public policy may include, for example,
180. New York Convention, supra note 86, at V(1).
181. IBA SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 14.
182. Id. at 16.
183. Id.
184. Id.
185. Mayer & Sheppard, supra note 97, at 233.
186. Id.
187. See supra Part II.A.
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relatively non-contentious rules such as those against anti-competition
agreements, the formation of de facto regional monopolies, and
corruption.18 8 Other substantive norms, relating to the protection of
diplomatic relations amongst nations, may similarly be part of an
Asian public policy, considering the objectives of the BRI to increase
transnational cooperation. The general approach to be taken as a first
step, from a practical perspective, could be to draft a negative list
including some of the matters above, such as anti-competition
provisions or procedural impropriety, under which awards are likely to
be turned down.
Harmonization of the public policy exception requires not absolute
uniformity, but consistency among the Belt and Road nations. This
would imply that while this geo-legal public policy forms just one part
of the nation-specific public policy under Article V(2)(b) of the New
York Convention, remaining nation-specific public policy must be
congruent with "Asian public policy." It is noted, as above, that judicial
custom emphasizes the narrow construction of Article V(2)(b) of the
New York Convention. 18 9 This pro-enforcement approach works in
tandem with harmonization efforts to tame the "unruly horse" of public
policy.
While there is no existing institution dealing with the
coordination of cross-border arbitral enforcement rules per se, it is
suggested that in the interim, the AIIB could take a proactive role in
coordinating the harmonization of national laws, whether in the
specific context of public policy harmonization or more broadly with
regard to trade- and investment-related regulations, which form an
integral part of the broad goal of trade facilitation under the BRI. 9 0
Although the AIIB's primary function is currently to provide loans for
infrastructural projects under the BRI development, the semi-
governmental constitution of the AIIB's corporate governance would
readily allow adaptation or creation of a new office or sub-organization
to discuss harmonization of legal norms and regulations, in which all
the Belt and Road nations would have a stake, necessary to the
efficient functioning of trade and commerce.
Whereas in the EU, the public policy exception has largely been
defined at the highest level of the CJEU where the CJEU is competent
only to make judgments of issues being litigated. Such an approach is
not recommended, since there is no supranational court under the BRI
so far (pretty much because the BRI aims to create an economically,
rather than a politically integrated zone). Whereas courts may
pronounce what public policy "is" or "is not" constituted in a particular
case, queries as to its concrete and substantive contents are left
unanswered in the lack of guidelines defined. From the perspective of
efficiency, and to ensure participation of all the Belt and Road nations
in determining certain shared matters under the BRI that are against
188. Id.
189. IBA SUBCOMMITTEE, supra note 102, at 6.
190. Id.
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a "regional" public policy, it would be more desirable to designate a
coordination institution such as the AIIB for this purpose.
D. Challenges and Other Aspects of Public Policy Harmonization
While the above discussion indicates that certain categories of
considerations may be incorporated into an Asian public policy,
challenges remain as to both the theory and implementation of
harmonization efforts.
1. Compatibility of Legal Systems and National Cultures along the Belt
and Road
A substantial difficulty which arises is to reconcile the approach
of different legal systems to public policy conceptions under Article
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention. As the Belt and Road's
metaphorical "silk road" moves the wide geographical spread of the
east Asia, south Asia, and central Asian regions, it simultaneously
navigates common law, civil law, and Islamic law systems; as well as a
wealth of nations divided along social, cultural, ethnic, and religious
lines.191 Even where the substantive contents of the public policy
exception are harmonized, differences in legal system and cultures
have a substantial impact on how the contents are to be interpreted.
First, the definition and span of the public policy concept itself fall
to different interpretations as amongst legal systems. The civil law
conception of public policy, or order public, is frequently viewed as
being wider in application as compared to the traditionally restrictive
interpretations to public policy under common law systems.1 92 This is
compounded by the interaction of jurisdiction-specific social and
cultural features. Such social characteristics belie the integral values
and interests of a nation, which goes to the root of national conceptions
of public policy. For instance, the Islamic concept of public policy
revolves around the spirit of Sharia law and its sources.19 3 The wide
divergences in culture amongst legal systems and values suggest an
inherent difficulty in achieving harmonization of the public policy
exception, of which contents are informed by the same.
This concern may be met with reiteration of the extent of Asian
harmonization applicable by the BRI. A universal prescription of public
policy considerations applicable wholesale to the entire Asia region is
not the goal of harmonization. A proposed "Asian public policy"
includes defined categories of matters which contravene public policy.
This does not preclude nations from retaining other nation-specific
public policy considerations provided that they do not come into conflict
with the "regional" policy. Further, given that the substantive grounds
of the "Asian public policy" proposed largely revolve around the
191. Id.
192. Mayer & Sheppard, supra note 97, at 223-24.
193. Id. at 219.
1346 [VOL. 51:1305
BELT AND ROAD ARBITRATION IN ASIA
facilitation of economic growth and commercial interactions amongst
the Belt and Road nations, there is less likely wide room for
contradiction.
A secondary concern of the influence of legal cultures on the public
policy exception is the existence of diverging standards of due process
amongst legal systems. Common law jurisdictions may hold parties to
arbitration to different standards of procedural fairness, as compared
to civil law systems, based on the idea that due process is connected to
natural justice.194 For instance, while the concept of "fraud" is well
established under common law, there may be definitional variation
when the same term is applied in non-common law legal systems.'9 5
This creates issues insofar as even where a substantive ground for
invoking the public policy exception is regionally harmonized,
enforcement courts may still be applying diverging standards in
determining its application. While it may be theoretically possible to
apply a "universal" standard with respect to specific public policy
grounds, to do so would be problematic in that inconsistencies would
be created with respect to judicial standards between international
arbitral enforcement and the remainder of the legal system. Such a
concern is more difficult to resolve. However, it is ventured that as a
matter of a judicial preference for upholding enforcement, enforcement
would be denied only on clear grounds of breach of public policy
considerations.
2. Creation of a "Transnational" Public Policy
A conceptual concern of a proposed harmonized "Asian public
policy" is the creation of a "transnational" public policy. A
"transnational" public policy has been defined by the ILA to refer to a
"truly international public policy . . . of universal application,
comprising fundamental rules of national law, principles of universal
justice, jus cogens in public international law, and the general
principles of morality accepted by what are referred to as 'civilized
nations.""9 6 An "Asian public policy" would appear to fit into the
category of a transnational public policy in that it contains
considerations that straddle borders and apply to a region of states.
This is problematic in that the public policy exception under Article
V(2)(b) of the New York Convention intends public policy
considerations to be nation-specific, albeit "international" rather than
"domestic" in nature. 197 Further, this is the understanding
194. Id. at 233.
195. Such is the case of fraud as a ground of refusing reciprocal enforcement of
judgments between Hong Kong, a common law jurisdiction, and China, whose system is
based upon civil law. See generally JIE HUANG, INTERREGIONAL RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT OF CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL JUDGMENTS (2014).
196. Mayer & Sheppard, supra note 97, at 220.
197. In other words, a national conception of "international public policy", rather
than "domestic public policy". The expression "international public policy" has been
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recommended by the ILA, although such an issue has yet to be
conclusively litigated by national courts. 198 In other words, when
drafted, Article V2(b) of the New York Convention intended that
enforcing states apply their own respective notions of public policy.
Nonetheless, as reiterated, the conception of a "regional public policy"
adopted by a group of nations is not inconsistent with nation-specific
nature of public policy envisioned under Article V(2)(b) of the New York
Convention.'"9 As stated above, the application of an "Asian public
policy" operates such that it constitutes just one category of public
policy considerations-itself, as explored above, a negative list, applied
by a jurisdiction. The existence of this region-specific public policy
impacts national public policy considerations only insofar as there are
inconsistencies, which would in any case need to be resolved to ensure
the cooperation of the nations with the region. As such, harmonization
does not limit the ability of a country to define its own public policy. It
simply aims to bring harmony to the application of the public policy
exception.
An additional practical concern may arise with respect to the
receptiveness of Belt and Road countries in adopting aspects of a
"regional" or "transnational" public policy as part of their nation-
specific public policy. In particular, it revisits the willingness of the
Chinese judiciary-and by necessary extension, the Chinese
government-to broaden the existing narrow definition of its nation-
specific "public policy," which is largely limited to fundamental
principles such as the safeguarding of China's national sovereignty,
public security, and the integrity of the legal system.20 0 To include
commercial concerns encapsulated and mandated by an "Asian public
policy" under the BRI, it is necessary to ensure the success of the
endeavor of China as the proposer and leader of the BRI. While there
has yet to be any governmental inclination in this proposal, it is
contended that the tangible commercial benefits associated with
harmonization, and the illustrations of the EU and OHADA
experiences, may lessen the skepticism of adopting a wider take on
public policy than currently prevails.
defined by the ILA not to refer to a public policy shared by a number of states, but he
part of a public policy belonging to a state, the contravention of which would prevent a
party from enforcing a foreign award. Id. at 251.
198. Bermann notes that while some jurisdictions, for instance, France and
Switzerland, make a distinction between domestic and international conceptions of
public policy, the position of most national courts is uncertain. See RECOGNITION AND
ENFORCEMENT, supra note 123, at 100.
199. New York Convention, supra note 86, at V(2)(b).
200. Qisheng He, Public Policy in Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards in the
Supreme People's Court of China, 43 HONG KONG L.J. 1037, 1044 (2013).
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VI. CHINA'S ECONOMIC RISE, SHIFTING POWER DYNAMICS:
IMPLICATIONS OF THE BELT AND ROAD INITIATIVE ON REGIONAL AND
INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE
"China is a sleeping dragon. Let her sleep; for once she wakes, she
will shake the world." 201 Sitting at the cusp of rapid economic
development, China now boasts the second largest economy in the
world and is poised to exert a greater influence on international
affairs.20 2
In addition to projected growth of commercial and trade
opportunities, the BRI and its impact on the Asian region is witnessing
a shift in regional power dynamics. As the founding nation of the BRI
and its facilitating institutions, China's increasing regional presence
and initiative offers a host of exciting possibilities for strengthening
international influence.
A. Cementing China's Regional Position as a Rising Economic
Superpower
As discussed previously, the BRI promises the creation of
commercial and trade opportunities across Asia through cross-border
cooperation on infrastructural development.20 3 China's own interest
in promoting the BRI is said to derive not only from a need to export
domestic overcapacity, but also to seek new overseas markets and
investment opportunities for the growth of domestic companies, as part
of its transition from an investment-based economy to one with greater
consumption.204 This transition into a "new normal" (M 9# , xin
changtai) of slower, stable economic growth further allows for
increased financial integration and strengthening of the Chinese
currency, Yuan.205 Export of China's developmental model through
the BRI establishes China's position as a regional powerhouse,
catalyzed by China's prominent role in spearheading the BRI. 206
China's significant contributions to the BRI development through the
establishment of the AIIB and Silk Road Fund exert China as a central
commercial hub for investors and businesses within the region.20 7
This holds the twofold benefits of increasing China's hard and soft
201. See China's Fitful Sleep, THE ECONOMIST (July 17, 1997)
http://www.economist.com/node/15 1617 [https://perma.cc/GZ9P-8B7K] (archived Sept.
11,2018).
202. China Overview, THE WORLD BANK, http://www.worldbank.orglen/country/
china/overview (last visited June 6, 2018) [https://perma.cc/M3T6-5HGD] (archived June
6, 2018).
203. Peter Ferdinand, Westward Ho-the China Dream and 'One Belt, One Road'
Chinese Foreign Policy Under Xi Jinping, 92 INT'L AFF. 941, 950 (2016).
204. Id. at 951.
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power within the region, particularly where China's initiative is
credited with raising much-needed infrastructural development within
the region. It further poises China to hold greater influence on the
international stage and raises its ability to compete with "traditional"
global powers predominantly situated in the West by extending its
influence across the Asian, European, and African continents.208
B. From Passive Adherent o Active Formulator of International
Norms
The BRI presents another overlooked opportunity for China. That
is the opportunity to contribute to the formulation of international
legal norms, an area traditionally monopolized by Western nations
such as the formation of the entire international arbitration system.
The BRI development provides a valuable opportunity not only to
premier and implement, but to demonstrate the benefits of a
"harmonized" Asian public policy. The success of such harmonization
yields not only economic benefits arising from increased investor
confidence and trade investment, but in terms of elevating China's
status from a mere adherent of international norms to an active
contributor of the same. This is significant in terms of the international
arbitration system, which due to the public policy exception is still
fragmented and disorganized in grounds of enforcement. While the
returns-both economic and power-based--of China's infrastructural
investment in the Belt and Road countries have yet to be seen, the vast
opportunities for development and construction of infrastructure
indicate a vast market for international arbitration within the region,
and in turn, the opportunity to square the circle and harmonize the
regulatory domains such as the public policy exception.
C. Relevance with International Governance and Chinese Rule of Law
In October 2017, the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of
China (CPC), took advancement of rule of law as one of its dominant
themes.209 Affirming the Constitution as forming the crux of the legal
system and promoting wide-ranging judicial reforms to tackle
institutionalized corruption, the CPC has lauded a "new era" in
committing to a "Chinese" rule of law suited to existing "national
conditions."210 Advancement of the rule of law has been viewed as
being crucial to the development of the Chinese market economy,
bolstering investor confidence and encouraging continued economic
growth.211 Indeed, another integral aspect of the development of a
208. Ferdinand, supra note 203, at 953.
209. Zhi Zhenfeng, 19th CPC Congress to Lead New Era of Rule of Law in China(
+Ai/SYf Ffffi Shijiuda Yinling Yifazhiguo Xinshidai), PEOPLE'S DAILY (Dec.
13, 2017), http://opinion.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1213/cl003-29702448.html [https:/
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Chinese rule of law is to bring China in line with first-world nations
that have traditionally dominated the realm of international
governance. As discussed above, the opportunities presented by the
Belt and Road place China in a prime position to pioneer and promote
harmonization of the public policy exception, through the active
formulation of widely agreed "public policy" norms. In addition to
permitting China to take on a more proactive role in writing norms
within the traditional global order, this further yields positive
implications in terms of China's demonstrated commitment to
promoting and adhering to the rule of law-not only within her
national borders, but across the Asia region. As China assumes a helm
of economic leadership within the Asian region, she may demonstrate
a further capacity to lead in the formulation of legal norms, inspiring
greater confidence in the international diplomatic community in its
ability to not simply partake in, but also lead aspects of international
governance.
VII. CONCLUSION
In the light of China's continued economic rise, the BRI provides
a unique opportunity for increased economic cooperation and
integration through the cross-border development of infrastructural
projects in the Asian region. Against the backdrop, international
commercial arbitration, due to its advantages, has been identified as a
primary vehicle in international dispute resolution within the BRI
Asia.
In looking forward, this Article has sought to demonstrate the
distinct advantages and benefits of increased harmonization of
arbitration regulatory landscape in the Asian region as a means to
bolster and further the multitudinous goals of strengthening cross-
border relationships, both commercial and as a matter of geopolitics.
The fundamental issue at stake in this context is how to harmonize
cross-border arbitral enforcement so as to ensure the requisite legal
and commercial certainty necessary to secure investor confidence.
While the BRI in the early stages is being propelled by states
under the continued upward development of the Chinese economy, its
consolidation and substantial successes in the future will hinge upon
continued investor confidence. In order to forge such confidence, a
strong and well-established dispute resolution system that is capable
of fairly, efficiently, and effectively solving transnational commercial
disputes is integral. This reduces commercial transactional costs and
will be critical in evaluating the success of China's Belt and Road
development policy and economic diplomacy strategy.
The BRI provides a golden opportunity for China to take the lead
in considering the possibility of harmonizing the public policy
exception in international commercial arbitration within the Asian
Belt and Road nations. There is a bright future in light of the existing
harmonization efforts of arbitration enforcement norms by the Asian
economies through the substantial adoption of the New York
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Convention and the Model Law. The remaining "unruly horse" of the
public policy may create issues of incompatibility in arbitral
enforcement, which is against the BRI's goal of economic integration
and commercial certainty. As the above analysis reveals, the
reconciliation of national public policies within the Asian region of the
BRI promises to yield significant benefits. Over time, this consolidates
and makes inroads towards the goal of enhanced economic integration
in the Belt and Road Asian region, and gradually, extend to all the
sixty-five countries involved in the BRI.
With these principles in mind, and drawing upon experiences of
the EU and OHADA, this Article suggests that public policy in context
of arbitral enforcement in the BRI Asia could be introduced at the
approach of a "negative list." It is further advocated that the creation
of a "transnational" public policy, as framed around the common
economic interests of the BRI and drawing on existing procedural and
substantive common grounds among the BRI Asia, may not be
compatible with the requirement of "national" public policy
considerations under Article V(2)(b) of the New York Convention.
However, as discussed, the practical implementation of this suggestion
depends much on the receptivity of the Chinese government in
widening the current narrow understanding of her nation-specific
public policy.
Being able to harmonize the public policy in international
arbitration within the BRI Asian context to achieve a predictable
system of investor confidence would set valuable precedent, projecting
renewed focus on China and Asia as an engine of not only economic
power, but also legal initiative in the transformation of China from a
passive norm-adherent o a norm-formulator. If China is successful in
even taking the first step towards leading the norm harmonization,
pending expansion, other regions may follow suit in regional
harmonization in the same vein. For this reason, the implications of
the arbitration initiative advocated by this Article are expansive and
reach beyond the boundaries of Asia and the Belt and Road roadmap,
holding potentials and progress for other economically integrated
regions that would benefit from consistency of norms and standards
delivered by dispute resolution processes across different jurisdictions.
Finally, as the world has harmonized much of the international
arbitration system based on the New York Convention, Model Law,
and UNCITRAL Rules, to complete the picture and minimize dispute
resolution costs, global harmonization of the public policy exception-
or getting as close to it as possible-holds a wealth of benefits to
enhance commercial certainty and investor confidence. As "true
harmonization" of the international arbitral system is the ideal goal in
an increasingly interdependent and globalized world, the opportunities
brought by China's Belt and Road development in the Asian context is
truly exciting.
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